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ABSTRACT
Although most readers of T. S. Eliot have agreed 
that the European experience of world war and the 
resultant political and cultural dislocations provided 
an important context and source of imagery for much of 
his work, what has not been recognized is Eliot's use of 
figures of war to represent the intimate yet 
antagonistic relations between the poet's writing of 
modernity and the text that is history. Beginning with 
a tropological analysis of Eliot's "A Note on War 
Poetry," relative to both the genre of war poetry and 
aesthetic modernity, this study examines the figural 
interpenetration of war and literary construction in 
Eliot's two "post-war" poems "Gerontion" and The Waste 
Land. In these poems, figures of war express the 
impulse to displace through formalist strategies of 
appropriation the real and threatening proximity of war 
to art, but, paradoxically, this very translation of the 
vocabulary of war into the terms of art exposes the 
inescapable correlation between the aesthetic and the 
historical, a correlation increasingly problematic in a 
time when all cultural forms seemed suddenly deprived of
their innocence. The study concludes with a close 
analysis of the figuration of war in Eliot's wartime 
poetry, the Four Quartets. To write poetry in a time of 
war, for T. S. Eliot, was to confront the accusations of 
history's "horrific capability," accusations of poetry's 
complicity, of its irrelevance, of its inadequacy. To 
figure such a threat into the poetry meant not to cancel 
or to evade history's accusatory colloquy but, by giving 
it form, to articulate the necessary implication of all 
writing in the conditions of history.
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
"A NOTE ON WAR POETRY"
Hugh Kenner has recently observed that T.S. Eliot 
has suffered the peculiar fate of never being credited 
for noticing anything: "We never ask what it's routine 
to ask about Wordsworth or even Keats: what Thomas Eliot 
may have observed when he opened his eyes, and what he 
made of it" (Muse 19). The critical charge of myopia 
seems unwarranted given that Eliot's reputation, however 
tarnished in recent years, still rests upon the accuracy 
of The Wasteland's diagnosis of the post-war milieu, a 
poem written by a poet many have thought of as the great 
diagnostician of twentieth-century life. And yet 
Kenner's point is true. We do not observe Eliot 
observing, bringing news of material specificities, in 
the way that Joyce or Pound did. Indeed, it is Kenner 
himself who in his major work on Eliot, The Invisible 
Poet, stressed the Eliotic vagueness, a symbolist 
strain that, coupled with a naturally ironic temper.
produced a poetry of such vagueness that Kenner called
his style "the most generalizing style in English
literature" (Muse 42). But now Kenner presents an
alert, attentive onlooker bringing news of the
mechanical novelties of the twentieth century and
grasping their effects on the rhythms of consciousness.
For example, the passage from the "Preludes" that we
have all routinely generalized as exemplifying the
alienation of the modern urbanite--
With the other masquerades 
that time resumes,
One thinks of all the hands 
That are raising dingy shades 
In a thousand furnished rooms.
Kenner himself observes that Eliot "was bringing 
news" of one of the century's new novelties, the mass- 
produced cheap alarm clock, which created the new 
world of the commuter and which explains why at one 
moment one could count on a thousand hands pulling up 
dingy shades--(i.e., the pull-down blind with spring- 
loaded rollers, which was also one of the novelties 
that allowed one to gauge life's rhythms to mechanical 
time rather than to the natural time of day and 
night.) Or the hour when one left work,
when the eyes and back 
Turn upward from the desk, when the human engine waits
Like a taxi throbbing waiting.
3Kenner adds :
And leaving the office one could choose the 
elevator or the stairs:
This is the one way, and the other 
Is the same . . .
The /other7 way was 7the same7 in two respects: it 
took you down, and it numbed your sensibility. It 
was the electric lift, in which you and your 
fellow commuters did not move, but the box you 
were standing in did the moving; a descent 
. . . not in movement
But abstention from movement; while the world 
moves (Muse 24-25).
But, if we do not observe Eliot observing, it is because
Eliot7s observations are not, as Kenner finally admits,
recognizable once embedded in the poem, crust as facts for
Eliot, in his thesis on Bradley, are not "merely found . .
. and laid together like bricks," but are prepared for by
interpretive systems, so the observed facts are
assimilated and transformed by formalist strategies in such
a way that the phenomenon of observation is so overwhelmed
by the foregrounding of rhetoricity that any recognition of
observed fact is subdued.
The methods are by now <juite familiar. There are the 
radical juxtapositions which remove conventional contexts 
and replace them with intertextual ones that emphasize not 
the word as object but rather the word as word--a
decontexualization that, undermining reference, seeks to 
reanimate and intensify the tropological play of words. 
There is also the method only used as successfully by 
Rilke, which Paul De Man describes as a reversal of figural 
relations: "the inwardness that should belong to the 
subject is located instead within things" (Allegories 36). 
Here, objects hold a dark, palpable subjectivity of their 
own, not of the self that considers them, and yet, upon 
approach, disappear into echo chambers of figural 
resources. Hugo Friedrich, referring to Sartre's 
definition for this method as "a lyrical phenomenology," 
writes that it "does not so much deform things as make them 
so inert, or impart so strange a vitality to things inert 
by nature that a spooky unreality is created" (qtd. in 
Hamburger 29).
Eliot exploits this chiasmus of word and thing, of 
feeling and sense, to confuse and to critique the nature of 
boundaries, of those lines defining the accepted verities 
of subject and object, those internal and external 
divisions, which conventionally schematize experience. Like 
many other writers and thinkers, Eliot was responding to 
the new sense that reality no longer resided in an 
objective universal order accessible through conceptual 
categories, but was present in the irrational and 
unconscious flux of experience. Constructs of mind,
whether linguistic, religious, or scientific, are all 
instrumental and provisional so that there is a gap between 
them and an ineffable reality, a gap that leads to the 
awareness that existence is determined by self-generated 
and provisional constructs. Eliot's blurring of outlines 
is a method both destructive and generative--destructive in 
the critique of reciprocity; generative in its attempt to 
grasp an elusive reality by means of words, to ally the 
universe of language with a unity of experience, to step 
out of that which already has been written for us into a 
new reality of words. According to Eliot, "art has to 
create a new world and a new world must have a new 
structure" ("London Letter" [Aug.] 216).
Although very different in many respects, modernists 
shared a faith in the indestructibility of the tie between 
the word and its object, a logocentric view that offered 
the possibilities of restructuring and transforming reality 
through language. The power of language was, as Shari 
Benstock states, "a transformative one, one that could 
remake the perception of the world and against which the 
world--despite its wars and crises of belief, despite 
radical changes in cultural norms, and redefinitions of 
physical and psychic occurrences--would remain stable"
(15). Frederic Jameson has described this modernist 
assumption as a "conviction that sense perception can
ultimately be fully rendered in a sentence structure, that 
a 'parole pleine' is possible, that the world really does 
exist to end up in a Book, which will replace it and in 
which the glint of sunlight on a pond, the stir of wind 
upon the earth's surfaces, will thus forever gleam and 
mildly tremble in the eternal immobility of the printed 
sentence" (25-26).
Luxuriously put. But invoking as it does Mallarme's 
ancestral blood, Jameson's phrasing--which makes use of a 
natural imagery suitable to any discussion of Eliot's 
poetry, permeated as it i3 with images of light, sea and 
vegetation--underscores the modernist's utopian desire to 
return to a pristine state preceding the self's entry into 
history, what Paul De Man describes as the impulse of 
modernity, the desire to wipe out all anteriority, 
everything that came earlier, rejecting temporality to 
reach a point of true origin existent in a singular, non- 
historical present. However, since "modernity" cannot 
exist without the negation of history, each pole necessary 
to the other's power, the impulse of modernity is 
inextricable from the realization of the ineluctably 
historical nature of existence--historical, as De Man says, 
"in the deepest sense of the term in that it implies the 
necessary experience of any present as a passing experience 
that makes the past irrevocable and unforgettable, because
it is inseparable from any present or future" (Blindness 
148-49). The privileging of the transformative power of the 
word does not then occur without the paradoxical desire to 
move beyond words through words, to move through words too 
saturated with previous articulations, accents, diversities 
of intent, through bearers of historical determinants, to 
some neutral Word unmediated by its existence in history. 
Or, as Eliot puts it, "to write poetry which should be 
essentially poetry, with nothing poetic about it, poetry 
standing naked in its bare bones, or poetry so transparent 
that we should not see the poetry, but that which we are 
meant to see through the poetry, poetry so transparent that 
in reading it we are intent on what the poem points at, and 
not on the poetry . . .  To get beyond poetry, as 
Beethoven, in his later works, strove to get beyond 
music.1,1
Meanwhile, below the moon, to return to Eliot's 
observations, the cultural artifacts of the furnished 
flat, the massive crowds of commuters, the underground and 
the telephone (which Kenner guesses to be the influence 
behind the disembodied voices of The Wasteland) testify to 
the effects of what some historians have called a Second 
Industrial Revolution, one that changed modern modes of
^rom an unpublished 1933 lecture cguoted in Matthiessen
96.
living. Consequently, they act as historical specificities 
carrying the force of history defined in the modern sense 
by Theodor Adorno as "Die Macht der Vergesellschaftung," 
those forces "organizing, rationalizing, 'socializing' the 
structure of society" (56). The very presence of such 
historically determined figures identifies the formalist 
strategies of appropriation as arising from an inescapable 
tension between the aesthetic and historical determinations 
of words and the determinations of culture, a tension 
which throws what seems to be at first hand merely an 
aesthetic or epistemological issue of reference and fact 
into a conflict between the synchronic act of the poem and 
the diachronic movement of history, a conflict that Eliot 
thematizes through the figuration of historically 
determined objects: the trams, the tube, the face-down 
crowds of commuters flowing over London Bridge.
But what of another of the century's historically 
determined "objects" whose broad scope and influence was 
made possible by the application of new technologies, 
namely the experience of world war? That Eliot took notice 
is most certain; one could hardly not. Along with the 
American Civil War, the first two world wars introduced a 
new kind of war. For much of modern Western history, the 
inhumane character of war was restrained by its 
institutionalization. War, a necessary evil, was an
institution, but one that did not interfere unduly with 
other functions of society. Restrained by what Freud 
called the myth of the "fellowship in civilization,1 war 
was conducted in such a way as to preserve the mold of 
civilization, which included the antagonistic parties 
(274) . The distinction between combatant and noncombatant, 
between those who are fit to fight and those who are not, 
was maintained in the effort to preserve the humane 
features of warfare and to confine violence through formal 
structures of decorum and class structure--witness the 
astonishing formalism of seventeenth- and eighteenth- 
century warfare with its correlation of power and 
aesthetics at the expense of efficiency. During the 
American Revolution, Americans continued to go abroad to 
study medicine in Edinburgh or painting under Benjamin West 
in London. During the Napoleonic Wars, paths for traveling 
armies were prescribed to allow for the freedom of civilian 
life. During the Crimean War, Russia paid its debt to its 
enemy Britain.
That World War I, as Henry James said, was a "plunge 
of civilization into this abyss of blood and darkness"
(384) was not so much because of the massive logistics 
involved or the extensive geographical area of hostilities, 
the putrid conditions of the trenches, and the massive 
number of casualties, but because of the changed character
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of war and the changed perception of the enemy.2 It was 
total war, the endeavor to make the operations of war as 
complete and all-encompassing as energy and technology are 
able, to the point where all life becomes ancillary to the 
logistical and tactical expression of the war machine. The 
destruction of armed resistance means not a contest between 
two professional armies but a complete punitive operation 
in which the entire living might of the enemy must be 
totally and indiscriminately destroyed. Bronislaw 
Malinowski, writing during the second World War, describes 
it thus:
Modern war makes it impossible to distinguish between 
the military personnel of an army and the civilians; 
between military objectives and the cultural portion of 
national wealth; and the means of production, the 
monuments, the churches and the laboratories. Lines of 
communication; seats of government; centers of industry; 
and even centers of administrative, legal, and 
scientific activity are rapidly becoming targets for 
destruction, as much as garrisons, fortified lines, and 
airdromes. . . War has to transform every single
cultural activity within a belligerent nation. The 
family and the school, the factory and the courts of 
law, are affected so profoundly that their work--the 
exercise of culture through autonomous self-contained 
institutions--is temporarily paralyzed or distorted. At 
present, it has become possible to transform some 
hundred million human beings into one enormous war 
machine. (264)
In total war, the human being is increasingly reduced 
to function, the individual submerged into a technological
2 For a discussion of the revolutionary quality of total 
warfare, see Weaver 92-112.
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sublimity, bis aggression and passion abstracted into the 
slogans of the state. In short, people become material, 
automatons of war.
Given that war, especially m o d e m  total war, is, to 
quote Wallace Stevens, the most "extreme pressure of the 
contemporaneous," how much more will its presence be felt 
in Eliot's poems? Most readers of Eliot have agreed that 
the European experience of world war and the resultant 
political and cultural dislocations provided an important 
context and source of imagery for much of his work--in 
"Gerontion," the burden of a decayed Europe's heroic past; 
in The Waste Land, a vortex of invading hordes, exploding 
cities, broken columns, and ruined towers; in Eliot's 
translation of Saint-John de Perse's Anabasis, the 
migratory conquests of Europe's pre-history; in "Coriolan," 
the ironic triumph of 1 post-peace1 politics; and in the 
Four Quartets, the "constellated wars" of bombers and 
blackouts, Krishna's battle yoga, civil war and civic duty, 
antique drums and dead patrols.
But if this context of war in much of Eliot's poetry 
(the above images being by no means exhaustive) is plain, 
the radical implications of the representation of war for 
the formalist project have been obscured by a text-centered 
critical tradition that, duplicating the modernist 
imperative to displace history through the patterning of
12
rhetoric, takes as axiomatic the formalist assumption of an 
impermeable boundary between the historical matrix of 
experience and the poetic text, without recognizing the 
self-critique in the very method itself.
Canonical readings of Eliot's poetry, dominated by the 
text-centered tradition of New Criticism, insist that there 
exists only an accidental or minimal relation between 
context and text, for the text is perceived to be an 
autonomous verbal construct that does not so much reflect 
extra-verbal constructs as displace or transmute them.
Those holding such a view, therefore, most often relegate 
references to war in the poetry to, as Stephen Greenblatt 
says, the "well-lighted pigeonhole" of historical 
background (103). This is not to say that such 
commentators have not been concerned with historical 
themes. Indeed, for the first forty years of Eliot 
criticism, critics emphasized historical, public themes and 
read the poetry as a topographical map of the age's 
spiritual anxieties, for the New Critic sees history not as 
a Heraclitian flux of sociopolitical and economic ripples, 
but as a river of revealed significance that always tells 
the same story--hence the New Critical leitmotifs of the 
fall from organic community, the loss of transcendent 
order, the secularization, thus alienation of man from 
communal values, the fragmentation of the modern world, and
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the quest for transcendent order. In short, the view is 
mythic, and as myth orders the chaos of discrete details 
into a formal unity, so does art. The act of synthesis, 
the complexity of connotations held in the equipoise of 
irony all harmonize the incongruities and complexity of 
experience into a unified whole that restores and thus 
reminds of a lost ideal order, based not on the logical 
positivism of the modern age but on the forgotten realm of 
analogy and correspondence. 3
Recognizing here the influence of the modernist 
construct of history in which contingent, local 
circumstances collapse into a grand narrative of community, 
detractors of this position have been quick to attack this 
methodology as one putting forward an ideological agenda 
masquerading as historical truth. So, Catherine Belsey, as 
a British academician trying to rout out the Leavis-Eliot 
influence, detects behind the invocation of history a move 
to suppress it by appealing to a grand narrative that shows 
that in essence things are as they have always been: "they 
constructed between them a lost Elizabethan utopia where 
thought and feeling were one, where the native rhythm of 
speech expressed in poetry the intuitive consciousness of
3 See Lewis Simpson's discussion of historicism and new 
criticism in The Possibilities of Order: Cleanth Brooks and 
His Work.
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an organic community, and everyone recognised in the 
principle of order the necessity of submission to the 
proper authorities, social and divine" (17).
And Paul Bove, in Destructive Poetics, attacks the 
modernist poetry of Eliot and Pound and the new critical 
practice of Cleanth Brooks as an almost conspiratorial 
attempt to "replace history with the Image of history":
"The poetic image of the Ideal put forward as the Word, the 
autotelic ironic poem, is offered as an alternative not 
only to positivistic actuality but to all historical and 
temporal actuality as well" (65) But this is not a 
question of historical criticism versus anti-historical 
criticism; rather, it is a situation or, as Timothy Bahti 
says in another context, "a battle between theoretical 
reflection and interpretive practice . . . fought within a 
conventional opposition between history and the non- 
historical" (32). Bove's fight is to effect a "critical 
destruction of the Modern critical mind" and to replace it 
with a Heideggerean hermeneutic; Belsey's is to integrate 
Foucauldian strategies into a Marxist historicism.
To call formalist historicism non-historical is to 
invoke a different view of history. The word "history," as 
Jonathan Culler has observed, is a powerful trope in its 
appeal to the real, and thus serves as a powerful polemical 
cudgel. To devalue the material aspects of history is only
to choose another view of the past. Appeal to history 
becomes an appeal to Reality. One may object to the New 
Critics' aesthetic view of history, but again, one may not 
call it non-historical. To return to the issue of war, 
they do deal with the war; they simply abstract its 
contingent, contemporary facts into a trope that figures 
the spiritual collapse of the civitas, the fragmentation of 
the mind of Europe into a symbol for the disorders of 
history as opposed to the order of myth conferred by the 
aesthetic.
In the last two decades, criticism of Eliot's poetry, 
and especially of the early poetry, has veered away from 
the public toward the private. The reasons for this shift 
are numerous. Among them are the publication of the 
manuscripts of The Waste Land, in which both editorial 
comment and textual evidence focused on the private theme, 
as well as the simply practical reason of critical 
exhaustion with aliusion-chasing and the futile search for 
some external referent that would provide narrative order 
to what appeared to be a web of fragments that veiled some 
hidden agenda. One contributing factor may have been the 
increasing impatience with Eliot's domination over letters 
for so many decades and the related need to subvert the 
prominence of a poet one unhappy Jacobin would call "an 
impressive catastrophe from which we may hope eventually to
16
recover" (Martin 12). And one common strategy of 
subjugation is the post-mortem exhumation of a poet's 
"personal demons," of compulsions, obsessions and 
idiosyncracies.
A less polemical influence, however, has been the 
integration of Eliot's poetry into the Romantic lyrical 
tradition and its valorization of the symbol as a mode of 
transcendence of the conflict between the fixity of concept 
and the dispersion of private emotion and sensation. While 
early critics grounded their readings on the cultural 
concerns of modernist rhetoric, critics of the last two 
decades have grounded their readings on the epistemological 
anxieties of modernist rhetoric. Working under the 
guidelines of Eliot's doctrine of the objective correlative 
and the adequation of personal emotion to impersonality of 
form, critics have concentrated on the "element of deep 
personal emotion" (Moody 47) and on the struggle to 
transmute private emotion into an aesthetic form that in 
its impersonality expresses a permanent truth about the 
life of the individual. Presenting "a consciousness aware 
of its own inner divisions," the poems become a series of 
textual strategies to organize, control, and transcend 
dueling psychic forces.
Unified by a common concern with the psychology of the 
lyric voice, critics generally disagree only in regard to
17
whether the poetry is perceived as succeeding in its goal. 
While many critics read the poetry as a space of freedom in 
which aesthetic form provides an avenue to self- 
integration, others, assuming the same private concern, 
disallow any such valorization of aesthetic form, arguing 
that the poetry takes place within the play of psychic 
oppositions. These conflicts have been discussed in 
numerous ways: conflict between the rational and active 
will and the intuitive passive self; between sexual desire 
and the opposing need for order and self-restraint; between 
romantic terror and yearning and intellectual detachment. 
The context for such polarities is most often posited as 
the split in Eliot's work between the symbolist strain 
which struggles to effect an autotelic poetry, reaching the 
condition of music, and the classical strain, which in 
search of moral and ontological fixity, struggles to 
express or objectify the depths of the buried self.4
The context of war, specifically of the Second World 
War, is usually brought in to point to the contrast between 
the brutality of the contemporary crisis and Eliot's 
figuration of war in the Four Quartets--a figuration 
attacked as either an escapist or irresponsible 
assimilation of a grave public situation into private
4 See Stead, Bergonzi, Bornstein, Moody, Traversi, Bush, 
Spurr.
concerns. Bernard Bergonzi, discussing Eliot's failure to 
engage truly the immediacy of history in the Quartets, 
complains that "one sees little sign of the events of 194 0, 
the year of Dunkirk, the fall of France and the Battle of 
Britain" (151). Graham Martin also attacks the figuration 
of war in "Little Gidding" as an irresponsible refusal to 
grapple meaningfully with the specific crisis at hand: "The 
London blitz is merely assimilated (though brilliantly) to 
the private theme; and in 1942 who but Eliot would be 
likely to have felt drawn away from the contemporary crisis 
by the 'antique drum' of Charles the Martyr's confrontation 
with Oliver Cromwell?" (19) And recently, M.L. Rosenthal, 
in a reference to the famous "l'entre deux guerres" 
passage of "East Coker" and to the Krishna-Arjuna section 
of "Dry Salvages," objects: "World War II had been under 
way for almost two years, and perhaps the military phrasing 
sprinkled through the passage suggests a twitch of stimulus 
to respond. . . Given the realities of the war and of Nazi 
behavior, though, neither passage can be taken seriously in 
this sense. The one combines personal self-pity with a 
poet-workman's complaint about his medium. The other talks 
of a 'field of battle' almost incidentally, and hardly in 
terms relevant to blitzkrieg and genocide" (1043) .
Once again, we find evidence of the current 
irritability with a poetry that seems to eschew political
and moral relevance, that seems to refuse "historical 
engagement" in favor of private concerns. But, 
underpinning Rosenthal's demand for a public stance, for a 
certain moral responsibility is something else. The 
particular irritant is not the unsuitability of war's being 
the subject of lyrical treatment but the unsuitability of 
war's being used to ground and to figure lyrical anxieties- 
-a figuration that suggests that Eliot irresponsibly and 
perversely extorts a situation of collective suffering for 
his own mandarin needs, instead of properly integrating his 
private concern into a level of generality that would speak 
to the historical crisis at hand. Indeed, these objections 
reflect an underlying, normative expectation of the proper 
relation of the lyric to the subject of war--an 
expectation arising from the presence of a new genre, 
namely that of "war poetry." Rosenthal's objection, 
grounded as it is by generic assumptions of what poetry in 
a time of war should do, interestingly exposes a problem 
concerning the relation between a poetics of private 
experience and the historical pressure of war, a problem 
that the Eliot passages self-consciously generate. But 
since Rosenthal's objection, not to mention Eliot's own 
text, arises out of the presence of war poetry, we must 
investigate the criteria of the modern war lyric so as to 
understand the implications of the radical intrusion of
figures of war into a text that appears to be concerned 
solely with an internal struggle between language and 
experience; for although war poetry and modernist poetry 
have been conveniently separated as categories of critical 
discussion, such a distinction should not obscure the fact 
that both endeavors, however different in styles, theories, 
or response, confront a similar problem: What is the proper 
relation between poetry and war in a time when literary 
representation, in its pursuit of Reality, is forced to 
grapple with a fact that threatens not only the validity of 
any literary endeavor but the validity of the concept of 
civilization?
it would be Henry dames, in his characteristic 
prophetic omniscience, who would early in the Great War 
perceive its implications for literary effort, and who not 
only expressed the moral shock of the situation but also 
predicted what would be an ongoing question for the rest of 
the century. In the often-quoted "war letter" to Howard 
Sturgis, written on the heels of England's declaration of 
war, James would first observe the war as a betrayal of 
history:
The plunge of civilization into this abyss of 
blood and darkness by the wanton feat of those 
two infamous autocrats is a thing that so gives 
away the whole long age during which we have 
supposed the world to be, with whatever 
abatement, gradually bettering, that to have to 
take it all now for what the treacherous years
21
were all the while making for and meaning is 
too tragic for words. (384)
Then, six months later, he would write of the problem of
the artist struggling to reflect adequately contemporary
reality in a universe where the very appeal to Reality
necessarily becomes implicated in a delusion:
The subject-matter of one's effort has become 
itself utterly treacherous and false--its 
relation to reality utterly given away and 
smashed. Reality is a word that was to be 
capable of this--and how represent that 
horrific capability, historically latent, 
historically ahead of it? How on the other hand 
not represent it either--without putting into 
play mere fiddlesticks? (446)
Robert Spoo, in an essay on James Joyce's treatment of the
War in Ulysses, paraphrases James's question: "how write a
novel about the modern world, with men and women as we know
them, without somehow figuring the war into the account?
There is no going back, James feels, no blinking at the
facts, for we know what we know. . . . How represent such a
nightmare as the one that has descended upon us? Which
window of the House of Fiction will «. Tve properly onto this
scene?" (149) But the troubled how's of James's passage
further imply a certain hopelessness at finding such a
window, since they reveal an anxiety at finding the
possible point of contact between imaginative structures
and a historical reality harboring such barbarism.
We will find a related anxiety if we turn to the 
attempt by both war poets and editors of war poetry 
collections to establish the legitimacy of this genre,5 a 
tension between the attempt to define the parameters of the 
true war poem on the basis of authenticity and realism and 
the simultaneous attempt to prevent the poem's being 
categorized by its very theme. Collections of war poetry 
today fill library shelves, holding within their covers 
selections from writers as diverse as Euripides, Horace, 
Emerson, Plath, and Jonson, a miscellany claiming a 
universality for the genre as if, since war seems to have 
always been with us, the title "war poetry" would hold all 
poetry ostensibly concerned with war. But "war poetry" is 
a guite modern phenomenon, arising with the first modern 
war, the Civil War, and developing during World War 1 by 
means of the efficient linking of the English literary 
establishment to the propaganda machinery demanded by 
modern warfare (See Wright 70-100). Yet to speak of "war 
poetry" is not to invoke the carefully orchestrated, 
ideological defense of Britain by such men of letters as
5 See, for example, Poems of War and Battle, ed. vere 
Henry Collins (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914); The Oxford 
Book of War Poetry, ed. Jon Stallworthy (New York: Oxford 
Univ. Press, 1984); War and the Poet, ed. Richard Eberhart 
and Selden Rodman (New York: Devin-Adair Co., 1945); The War 
Poets, ed. Oscar Williams (Miami, Fla.: Granger Books,
1945); A Treasury of British War Poetry (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1917).
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Newbolt, Kipling or Bridges but to invoke the poetry of 
what John Pudney has called "the modern legend of the War 
Poet"--the war lyrics of writer-combatants--Brooke, Jones, 
Owen, Sassoon, and others--that would continue even into 
the war poetry of World War II, a legend whose anatomy has 
been so carefully studied by Paul Fussell in The Great War 
and Modern Memory.
The war poetry of the writer-combatants was new 
because its joining of the lyric impulse to the personal 
experience of the brutal conditions made any grand 
treatment either obsolete or obscene. Neither glorifying 
war nor nations, the modern war poem substitutes personal 
expression for public declamation, authentic experience 
being thought more deeply true than the grand abstractions 
of public forms and themes. Wilfred Owen would be the 
first to mark this effort to distance the war poem from 
patriotic versification: "This book is not about heroes. 
English Poetry is not yet fit to speak of them. Nor is it 
about deeds, or lands, nor anything about glory, honour, 
might, majesty, dominion, or power, except War. Above all 
I am not concerned with Poetry. My subject is War, and the 
pity of war. The Poetry is in the pity" (31) . Poetry, if 
it is to be a "true commentary on war," is to speak of the 
tragedy of immediate occasion, is to be honest in its 
elegy, satire, irony, or pathos. The numbing dimension of
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modern war is perceived as too large for adequate treatment 
or, as Thomas Hardy thought, as too tragic, the only 
alternative being "to provide footnotes, the small, 
detailed cameos of our own experience" (qtd. in Williams 
19). To grasp the tragedy of war is to grasp it 
emotionally, the criterion being, according to Mark Van 
Doren, "a matter of registering experience and feeling" 
(Williams 20).
This high value placed on authenticity of experience 
leads quickly enough to the distinction between the 
combatant and noncombatant and, on the part of the 
combatant, an ensuing distrust of civilian war poetry, not 
only because civilians tended to write the patriotic "buck- 
me-up, 1 but also because the civilian could not possibly 
render the authentic experience of war and at worst, would, 
according to Frederic Prokosch, render a "form of 
compensation for the sense of guilt deriving from inaction, 
a luxuriant steambath of second hand and third-hand 
emotion" (Williams 19). Ezra Pound himself, searching for 
a way to set down "real war emotion," would be troubled by 
the doubt that the non-combatant could ever come close to 
the kind of authenticity needed to avoid either commercial 
opportunism or literary falsity (See Longenbach Stone 
Cottage 105-34). The problem for the combatant was to 
write of the war experience authentically without
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pandering to the public desire for vicarious titillation or 
inspirational moralizing.
Alongside this growing definition of the "true war 
poem," there is in many of the same prefaces to war poetry 
collections a curious reluctance to admit any necessary 
relation between war and poetry. In defense oif poetry's 
autonomy, primacy is denied to the conditions of war and 
their influence upon the creation of the genre. An appeal 
is made to the "spiritual" or "general" and thus atemporal 
qualities of art, seeking to distance art both from the 
collective cry for inspirational war poetry and from the 
authentic particularities of barbarism. The appeal is 
common and is made along two overlapping fronts: 1) war,
which is essentially destructive, is antithetical to art, 
which is essentially creative -- John Berryman: . "I should 
be sorry if the relation between one of man's most 
destructive and witless activities and one of his most 
purely and intelligently creative activities should seem to 
be very close or satisfactory" (Williams 29). 2) War,
since it is merely a subject, neither encourages great 
poetry, nor makes great poets. Although war and its 
conditions provide matter for the poem, poetry, "a complex 
essential operation of the spirit" (Eberhart), in its 
pursuit of a level of generality transcends its subject 
matter, thus making war irrelevant to its essence.
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George Herbert Clarke, writing in a preface to a 
volume of war poetry in 1917, affirms that "the first duty 
of the war-poet toward his art is to be a poet, to discover 
the timeless and placeless in the momentary and parochial, 
and to bring back to us a true and moving report of the 
experience and behaviour of the human spirit during its 
recurrent struggle with its own worser self" (35). And, 
Henry Treece, ringing the same changes in 1945, affirms 
that "War, as X see it here and now, is not the material of 
poetry. Lasting poetry must go down deeper than the 
superficial appearances of war machines; it must seek out 
the spirit of man in pain and glory, and must express that 
spirit and that pain and that glory in simple terms, in 
those fundamental statements to which the mechanisms of 
contemporary warfare are irrelevant" (Williams 24).
If we turn to T. S. Eliot's only public statement 
concerning the relation of war to poetry, a brief essay 
written in 1942, we will find him making many of the same 
points, arguing for the essential independence of poetry as 
poetry from the influence of the "shock of war" or the 
collective demands of patriotism ("Wartime" 351). 
Differences arise, however, from his assumed position of 
authority and from his characteristic use of irony to 
reinforce that position. Writing neither as a "war poet" 
nor as an editor, his critical pre-eminence conspicuous,
Eliot, the "Elder Statesman of Poetic Revolution, 1,6 
speaks from the Republic of Letters on a provincial matter, 
whose issues have been clouded by insufficient grounding in 
the essential elements of Art. The title of the essay, "T. 
S. Eliot on Poetry in Wartime," itself testifies to this 
role, as does Eliot's bland, ironic tone of genial 
equanimity. Eliot's irony tells more pointedly, however, 
in its dismissiveness: characteristically, he takes a 
Question and, instead of answering it, forms it into 
another question by turning the possible responses into 
dichotomies, which, once placed within the context of the 
new question, are nullified by being shown to be 
inadequate. The original question, ethical in nature--how 
should poetry be written in a time of war?--produced two 
responses, those of inspirational public poetry and the 
private war lyric. Eliot renders both irrelevant by posing 
a new question, aesthetic in nature--is the poetry of war 
necessarily a better type of poetry?
Answering the public's outcry for an inspirational war 
poetry, Eliot criticizes the notion that war necessarily 
produces a great poetry. During time of war, he says, there 
are two types of "war poetry": patriotic poetry "which
6 The label is Kenner's, one which Eliot would have 
approved given his response to one interviewer, "One seems to 
become a myth, a fabulous creature that doesn't exist."
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expresses and stimulates pride in the military virtues of a
people" and a private poetry that arises out of an
individual's experience of war, a poetry usually of
“lament, involving pity and regret . . .  involving issues
of threat to liberty, sorrow at defeat, or indignation" or
of "some limited experience, even trivial experience such
as cold, discomfort, or the boredom." As for the first
type, the patriotic, there is no historical example of a
great poetry:
The greatest war poem of Europe is Homer's Iliad: 
it was not written during the Trojan War; and, 
although Homer was a Greek, I think that he makes 
the Greeks appear rather more unpleasant than the 
Trojans. Dante, no doubt was passionately devoted 
to his native Florence, and he certainly lived 
through a period of disorder; but I think that his 
love of Florence is revealed not by recital of her 
martial glories, but by his vehement lament over her 
corruption. At the time of the Napoleonic Wars, 
both Wordsworth and Goethe were living and working: 
neither of them can be accused of lack of public 
spirit, but neither is conspicuous for having made 
poetry out of the wars of his time . . . There is no 
first-rate poem about the victory over the Armada or 
the Battle of Trafalgar.
Conceding that patriotism supplies the emotional center for
much of the work of Shakespeare and Milton, Eliot points
out that their poetry did "not need the shock of war to set
it to work." If the poet feels any duty as poet, it is
toward his language, to preserve and to enrich the
heritage. Conceding, too, that many good poems have been
written by soldiers on the World War I front and that
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during the current war, poets in military service write 
from the context of war, Eliot states that the poems are 
most often expressions of some limited personal experience, 
even trivial experience, rather than expressions of the 
large experience of war itself. "You cannot understand 
war--with the kind of understanding needed for writing 
poetry . . . while you are in the midst"; it must "become 
part of a man's whole past," and if it is to "bear fruit" 
in poetry, "it is likely to bear fruit in something very 
different from what, during time of war, people call 'war 
poetry'" (351). The fall of Dunkirk, blitzkrieg--the 
extreme pressure of the contemporaneous--must be collapsed 
into a larger "life."
And, in a poem written the same year, entitled "A Note 
on War Poetry," Eliot repeats the argument of the essay:
Not the expression of collective emotion 
Imperfectly reflected in the daily papers.
Where is the point at which the merely individual 
Explosion breaks
in the path of an action merely typical 
To create the universal, originate a symbol 
Out of the impact? This is a meeting 
On which we attend
Of forces beyond control by experiment-- 
Of Nature and the Spirit. Mostly the individual 
Experience is too large, or too small. Our emotions 
Are only 'incidents'
In the effort to keep day and night together.
It seems just possible that a poem might happen
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To a very young man: but a poem is not poetry-- 
That is a life.
War is not a life: it is a situation.
One which may neither be ignored nor accepted,
A problem to be met with ambush and stratagem.
Enveloped and scattered.
The enduring is not a substitute for the transient, 
Neither one for the other. But the abstract conception 
Of private experience at its greatest intensity 
Becoming universal, which we call 'poetry',
May be affirmed in verse.
Yes--Poetry, that abstract, hence universal conception of 
private experience, that transubstantiation of historicity, 
that symbolically enclosed autotelic world. But the 
rhetorical praxis of the poem in its figuration of war to 
express the nature of the poetic act subverts this 
proposition by relating the violence of war to the violence 
of symbolic enclosure, a violence that motivates the 
displacement of history not because of some fastidious 
disdain for the quotidian but because of an anxiety arising 
from this equation of destruction with the synthesizing 
structures of the poetic act.
But, how exactly is war figured in this poem? Through 
a figural ambiguity, of which an analysis may not only do 
much to clarify this poem but may also provide a basis by 
which to discuss how war figures in Eliot's work as a 
whole. In the discussion that follows, the terms
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metaphorical and metaphor refer not to metaphor as a 
generic term denoting any figural relation, but rather 
metaphor as one of the so-called four major tropes, as 
defined by Kenneth Burke in A Grammar of Motives (503-17). 
If the figure of war is metaphorical, that is, if it is 
based on resemblance, then the argument is as follows:
The writing of poetry is like the waging of war 
because they are both agonistic acts. Poetry here is a war 
between the abstract and the particular, a struggle to 
achieve the symbol, the form of mediation. For Eliot, this 
process of mediation is violent, thus the tropic use of 
war. The transformation of the merely individual and the 
merely typical into the universal is like an explosion 
breaking in a path of action. If one rearticulates the 
opposites of individual and universal in terms of the 
religious opposites of Nature and Spirit, the process of 
incarnation (or if one prefers, of "totalization") is cast 
in a context of a violent meeting of forces, which we 
"attend upon," in the military sense of accompanying or 
waiting upon an enemy for hostile purposes. But if we are 
in attendance, our attendance is somehow inadequate, for 
this meeting is beyond our "control by experiment," 
experiment in the sense of any empowered action of testing, 
but also experiment in its archaic sense of experience.
Next to the mysterious and uncontrollable meeting of Nature
and Spirit, the individual experience is either too large 
or too small. Introducing the psychological counterpart to 
the above dichotomies of individual and typical. Nature and 
Spirit, Eliot posits the struggle of the experiential self 
to maintain some continuity, from moment to moment, from 
day to night, as a military effort, but only a small one, 
only one incident in a campaign of forces beyond 
apprehension or control. This is not to say that one poem 
may not arise out of one experience, or one incident, but, 
as Eliot always maintained, the writing of a poem is 
distinct from the achievement of poetry: one is transient, 
the other, which is a "life," is enduring.
Yet to read the figural relation of Eliot's poem this 
way, solely in terms of metaphor, would be to ignore the 
primary focus, which is not the writing of poetry in 
general, but the writing of poetry in the specific context 
of war or the writing of poetry about war--a focus 
suggesting relations of metonymy. Metonymy, often described 
as the part standing for the whole, is a figure in which 
one phenomenon is substituted for another that stands in 
close relation. While the metaphorical relationship is one 
based on the shared property of two elements, or one could 
say on a common predicate, the metonymic relation is one of 
contiguity, an extrinsic relation, whether causal or 
material, so that the effect could stand for the cause, the
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agent for the effect, the inventor for the invented, the 
container for the contained. Thus the properties of war can 
become metonymical substitutions for the activity of poetry 
since war is the literal context or even motivation and 
hence material cause for the writing of poetry. When Eliot 
writes
Where is the point at which the merely individual 
Explosion breaks
In the path of an action merely typical 
To create the universal, originate a symbol 
Out of the impact?
the relation between the destructive and the creative is
not an "as if," since the context concerns the poet writing
in wartime, where explosions do break in paths of action
and where a poet writing a poem about a battle may struggle
to originate a symbol out of the impact. A poet may find
himself writing in a time of war, and he may write about
war from experience; so, a state of chance juxtaposition
between the life of a man suffering a time of war and the
life of a poet writing in a time of war may exist. The
metonymic relation of war to poetry, because based on
extrinsic relations, excludes any necessary influence or
equation between the two, for the part-to-part relations of
metonymy are never based on a shared quality or intrinsic
connection. This would seem to explain the implication of
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uncertainty and hazard of the phrases "Where is the point . 
. . ," "it seems just possible," "a poem might happen."
Nevertheless, the very fact that a figural relation 
exists at all demands more than metonymy. So, 
interpretation vacillates between the extrinsic relation of 
contiguity and an inclusive relation of resemblance, a 
vacillation between difference and identity that can be 
explained by the fact that as Gerard Genette maintains, 
"every metonymy can be converted into a synecdoche by 
appeal to a higher totality" (109). Both metonymy and 
synecdoche involve relations between parts to wholes 
(whether metonymy is a form of synecdoche, or synecdoche a 
special function of metonymy depends upon which rhetorician 
one reads), but while metonymy is always a reduction of 
either a whole to one of its parts or the reduction of one 
part to the status of another part, synecdoche assumes an 
intrinsic relationship of shared essence so that, to refer 
to Hayden white's definition, two parts are constructed "in 
the manner of an integration within a whole that is 
qualitatively different from the sum of the parts and of 
which the parts are but microcosmic replications" (35) . If 
metonymy reduces, synecdoche represents so that either side 
of an equation may represent the other. In synecdoche, the 
relation between the literal and the tropic are compatible 
because they "belong" to each other. Thus, in Eliot's
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poem, the ambiguity of figural intention arises out of the 
fluctuation between metonymic and synecdochic relations.
The whole process of mediation of the dichotomies of 
experience, which involves both the struggle with language 
or the formal to embody the experiential or the particular, 
is reduced to the activity of war. At the same time, there 
is an opposite movement toward integration. If to represent 
synecdochically is to suggest an organic belonging, then 
the analogical drive to integrate particular phenomena into 
a meaningful totality is an act of power, the shared 
ontology of poetry and war.
After the fourth stanza, the figural relation between
war and poetry abruptly stops, and two stanzas, completely
discrete, follow, one on the situation of war, the other on
the entelechy of poetry:
War is not a life: it is a situation,
One which may neither be ignored nor accepted,
A problem to be met with ambush and stratagem,
Enveloped and scattered.
The enduring is not a substitute for the transient. 
Neither one for the other. But the abstract 
conception
Of private experience at its greatest intensity 
Becoming universal, which we call 'poetry'.
May be affirmed in verse.
Now there is no participation, no shared ontology; now the
only relation between poetry and war is difference: "That
[Poetry] is a life/ War is not a life."
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The alignment o£ life and poetry against war and 
situations depends upon an underlying distinction between, 
on the one hand, history defined as mere events, 
chronological bits, relative positions and sets of 
circumstances, particular or striking complexes relative to 
context and, on the other, "life" as a transhistorical 
reality of lived, shared experience, the "Erlebnis" of 
modern historicism, that deeper reality made up of the 
experience of humankind considered independent of 
particular changes in time and location. Poetry embodies 
this "life" and as such seems to have a moral function in 
its expression of an independence from a historical 
situation antithetical to its and our "life." Once again, 
we seem to have the traditional view of aesthetic 
formalism, which insists on the separation of history and 
art. Although this retreat from figuration may result from 
anxiety, from a need to invalidate the real and threatening 
proximity of war to art suggested by the figuration, we are 
told that war is not a situation to be ignored or accepted, 
that it is to be met with "ambush and stratagem,/ Enveloped 
and scattered." Art denies its kinship to war and 
defensively responds by attempting to absorb into itself 
the violence of history.
The "contact," however, between this formal violence 
of poetry, scattering and ambushing, and the violence of
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history is subverted by the retreat from figuration of war 
into the serene detachment of the last stanza. The last 
stanza concludes the poem's appeal to the wholeness of a 
life somehow completed in its seamlessness yet unfinalized, 
a wholeness that stands in opposition to the broken bits of 
"situation," a conclusion which points to the life- 
enhancing, history-denying properties of the symbolic 
order. Thus, the interrelationship of temporal counters 
throughout the poem is significant. The daily chronicles, 
individual actions and transient situations are points of 
contact, necessary counterpoints to the universal, 
enduring, or typical occurrences of life; poetic discourse, 
an inevitable fugue of time. Poetry is to participate in a 
generality, not of the "collective" will, but a generality 
effected by a descent into individuation, the "intensity" 
of which culminates in a condition of universality which 
meshes all incongruities into the "life" of the symbol, a 
life above a life. Here times, customary tenses, are 
abstracted, by means of the symbol, not into eternity but 
into some absolute time of ideal conditions, its tenses 
formed by, but independent of, the histories of past and 
present. Notwithstanding, the cynical tone of the last 
line's "may be affirmed in verse" and the switch from the 
august "Poetry" to the mundane "verse" mark the tenuousness 
of affairs here.
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As we have seen, the poem's figuration of war both 
absorbs war into the terms of art and reduces art to war, 
much like Wittgenstein's box, which, depending on the trick 
of the eye, can be solid, lidless, open, or not a box at 
all ("the text interprets the illustration every time")
(3e). Depending on how one reads Eliot's figural trick, 
the poem either metonymically glosses the war poet question 
or metaphorically "collapses" the subject of war into a 
seemingly distinct concern, yet it is the synecdochic hinge 
of the vacillation itself that exposes the broader and 
inclusive concern, the relation of the aesthetic to the 
historical, and the necessity of writing modernity-- 
modernity understood not as a historical but as an 
aesthetic and normative concept--a distinction first 
artistically realized by Baudelaire, whose opposition of 
modernity (roughly equivalent to DeMan's impulse of 
modernity as discussed earlier) to historical modernity 
resonates behind Eliot's "conflict" of dichotomies, not to 
mention behind the theories of the genre of war poetry.
Baudelaire, achieving almost a mythic status as the 
originator of the modern, the discoverer of "1'avenement du 
neuf," recognized what Matei Calinescu describes as a split 
in the concept of modernity into aesthetic modernity and 
historical modernity, a fissure coming out of a profound 
historical relativism (4 0) . Historical modernity is the
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period we associate with bourgeois culture, its 
comprehensive technological revolutions, its values of 
pragmatism, reason, action, success and progress.
Aesthetic modernity, also based on sweeping historical 
change arising and sometimes synonymous with romanticism, 
involves the aesthetics of transitoriness and immanence, 
whose values revolve around novelty produced by change, its 
goal the formal seizure of presentness. More of an 
achieved condition than a period concept, aesthetic 
modernity takes as its stimulus and raison d'etre an 
intractable opposition to past tradition, to bourgeois 
modernity, and sometimes even to itself because of its own 
inescapable dependence on historical modernity. The 
challenge of modernity entails several problems: 1) how to 
express the newness of the present without basing the 
aesthetic upon socio-historical conditions whose values 
are inimical to it; 2) how to make the brutality of modern 
life poetic, the banal heroic, the sordid mysterious; 3) 
how to keep the independence and stability afforded by 
tradition but not its claims of an abstract academicism and 
at the same time be true to the transitory nature of the 
moment without falling into mere fashion (what DeMan calls 
the ashes of a true modernity).
Baudelaire's solution to this problem of alienation 
both from an oppressive past and a sordid present is his
concept of modernity set forth in "Le Peintre de la vie 
ffloderne." A quick paraphrase of his argument will show 
how Eliot's poem plays off of its terms. He argues that 
every artistic creation must combine the "eternal" and the 
"immutable" with the "transitory," the "fugitive" and the 
"contingent," must distill the permanent from the ever- 
changing present in order to extract from fashion the 
"poetry which lives in the historical" (13). Allegiance 
first belongs to the purity of instantaneity, grasped 
through the force of imagination, a modernite of such 
precision that the veneer of conventional reality cracks, 
allowing the artistic eye to go beneath the banality of 
observable appearances to a reality where the ephemeral and 
the eternal are one. Much more than a claim for the 
validity of modern subjects (that being an old song since 
the fifth century), Baudelaire's emphasis on the sordid and 
the brutal was to lead through the alchemy of art to the 
poetic, for the act of modernite must take place along the 
pressure points of the antithetic--the general-particular, 
sensory-ideal, spiritual-material--not reconciling 
oppositions into a higher synthesis but through the acute 
play on contrast, forcing a transient and mystical 
transformation of reality into a more real reality. Ever 
grounded in the consciousness of the irreversibility of 
time, modernity becomes an act, both normative and heroic,
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whose exercise must be repeated with each successive 
generation. Matei Calinescu describes this ongoing attempt 
to reconcile permanence and change, the past and present as 
"the paradoxical possibility of going beyond the flow of 
history through the consciousness of historicity in its 
most concrete immediacy, in its presentness." He continues, 
"Aesthetically speaking, 'the eternal half of beauty' 
(consisting of the most general laws of art) can be 
brought to a fleeting life (or afterlife) only through the 
experience of modern beauty. In its turn, modern beauty is 
included in the transhistorical realm of values--it becomes 
'antiquity'--but only at the price of renouncing any claim 
to serve as a model . . . Separated from tradition . . . .  
artistic creation becomes an adventure and a drama" (50).
Certainly Eliot would.not use the term "modern" or any 
other words fallen from its tree with the veneration of the 
time, yet oddly enough, Eliot's idiosyncratic use of the 
words "tradition," "classicism," and the "historical sense" 
would carry very much the same intimations as Baudelaire's 
modernity. However polemical in context, each term in some 
way would point to some adequation of the present to the 
past. Historians of English modernism have shown how 
Eliot's contribution to early modernism was his strategic 
use of values deemed corruptive and repressive such as 
tradition, rhetoric, and impersonality to effect the avant-
garde values of originality/ authenticity and radicalism.
So Eliot's early prose revolves around paradoxes: the 
anti-rhetorical poetry of free verse will end up in a 
"vicious rhetoric," to write only of the contemporary will 
be to end up "in obsolescence," and only through the threat 
of the conventional or of rhetorical difficulty can the 
effect of sincerity be given. Beneath the strategic and 
practical uses of such ironism lay the realization of the 
supple paradoxes of modernity. To appear most 
contemporary, a tradition must be created that would offer 
on the surface the legitimacy of orthodoxy yet be available 
for the opposition, appropriation or revision of the 
present. The invention, reclaiming, and propagation of 
genealogies would offer the suppleness required of a 
tradition that would be static, yet changing, multivocal 
yet unified by the local point of appropriation in the 
present. So Baudelaire's modernity, "a poetry which lives 
in the historical," would become Eliot's "historical 
sense": "This historical sense, which is a sense of the 
timeless as well as of the temporal and of the timeless and 
of the temporal together, is what makes a writer 
traditional. And it is at the same time what makes a 
writer most acutely conscious of his place in time, of his 
contemporaneity" ("Tradition" 37). To be conscious of 
one's place in time, to be able to locate the demarcations
of the permanent and the transient involves the fictive 
assumption of an Archimedean point, a neutral point of 
observation, independent of the obfuscations of language 
and experience. Indeed, Jeffrey Perl notes Eliot's 
assumption in his essays "of a vantage point outside of 
tradition, or more specifically at the end of one. . . the
belief that the late-modern vantage point makes visible, 
for the first time, the curve of modern history" (69). The 
ideal of mythic consciousness, the ability to hold the 
contingencies of history within an enclosure of form that 
would allow for the independence of observation and at the 
same time for the meaningfulness of experience--thus 
Eliot's "note" can be read as an attempt to find that 
"point" ("Where is the point at which the merely 
individual..."), the figure of war being merely an 
available, if not cliched, trope for transforming the 
private specificities of experience into the general and 
impersonal form of the symbol. And indeed, the few critics 
who have mentioned this poem usually quote only the last 
stanza without any discussion of its context of war poetry. 
However, it is the very subject of war poetry specifically 
that identifies the necessity of writing modernity 
underlying the "conflict" of dichotomies.
In the attempt of war poetry to successfully present 
the immediate experience of war in all its novel misery
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without losing a transhistorical value that asserted the 
independence of human experience over and against history, 
it duplicated the exigencies of aesthetic modernity. In 
turn, Eliot's figuration of war duplicates the modernist 
appropriation of history through formal strategies that 
seek not so much to displace as to master, and in 
mastering, to articulate its own authentic stance. But 
this "stance" of observation, if you will, is compromised 
by the intersection of the narrative violence of history 
and the violence of form, for the cutting through of the 
boundaries between experience and form, of action and 
observation, of history and poetry, which the figuration of 
war allows, raises the question: when poetry attempts to 
absorb the violent dislocations of history, will it succeed 
in eradicating them, in transcending them, or will it 
simply internalize them, thereby manifesting in its own 
tangle of linguistic structures (as indeed the "Note" has 
done) the very dislocations if sought to dissipate?
In 1921, after attending the London premiere of 
Stravinsky's Le Sacre du Printemps, Eliot, echoing 
Baudelaire's claim for the "heroism of modern life," 
praised Stravinsky's endeavor "to transform the rhythm of 
the steppes into the scream of the motor horn, the rattle 
of machinery, the grind of wheels, the beating of iron and 
steel, the roar of the underground railway, and the other
barbaric cries of modern life; and to transform these 
despairing noises into music" ("London Letter" [Oct.] 452). 
But what of the barbaric cries of total war that would make 
two sweeps during Eliot's career? Anything other than to 
observe them first-hand would result in their being 
transformed into a poetry resisting that "horrific 
capability" of history James pointed to. In the poems 
"Gerontion," The Waste Land, and Four Quartets, war does 
not remain neatly pinned against the background wall of 
context, delegated to act like Eliot's favorite ghost 
behind the arras who menacingly moves forward when the back 
is turned, only to disappear once again behind the arras 
when confronted. Rather, figures of war "break" into the 
texts, exposing the antagonism between the poet's modernity 
and the text that is history. The very presence of war does 
not so much complicate this writing of modernity as to hold 
it hostage to what it seeks to resist--that its very 
resistance to history is itself a symptom of its own 
complicity.
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CHAPTER TWO 
"GERONTION": THE THEATRICS OF WAR
The voice of "Gerontion," a poem written during the 
same year as the Treaty of Versailles, does not seem to 
resist the "horrific capability" of history; it embraces it 
as fact, testifies to the incomprehensibility of historical 
processes, weaving out of the context of the profound 
psychological and physical shock of World War I a 
lamentation that draws its sustenance from the drama of its 
utterly defeated landscape. Its resistance, however, is to 
be found in the alliance of eloquence and defeat that 
serves to displace the reality of war by a figural merging 
of literary discourse and war.
in 1943, Yvor Winters described "Gerontion" as a 
"portrait of an individual from whom grace has been 
withdrawn, and who is dying of spiritual starvation while 
remembering his past." Since then, most commentators have 
read "Gerontion," despite its radical innovations in poetic 
form, as a continuation of the tradition of the dramatic 
monologue--in which a speaker or character speaks to the 
reader, expressing a particular narrative theme--and much 
energy has been spent in the search for historical and
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literary personages who may have inspired Eliot's creation. 
A. C. Benson's Fitzgerald, Tennyson's Ulysses, the biblical 
Samson, and even William Butler Yeats have all been 
successfully argued for, but none more convincingly than 
for the Henry Adams of Eliot's review of The Education, 
written, enticingly enough, during the same period that 
Eliot was at work on "Gerontion."
There Eliot attacked Adams as a product of the New 
England mind, in love with the operations of its doubt yet 
bound by the demands of a conscience weakened by a 
pervasive moral debility. Eliot says of Adams, whom he saw 
bewildered yet captivated by skepticism, "Wherever this 
man stepped, the ground did not simply give way, it flew 
into particles; towards the end of his life, he came across 
the speculations of Poincare, and Science disappeared, 
entirely. He was seeking for education, with the wings of 
a beautiful but ineffectual conscience beating in a vacuum 
jar" (362). So the cold and arid movement of Gerontion's 
skepticism seems to generate the "fractured atoms," like 
the wind that blows through the poem, withering everything 
in its midst into the hollowness of despair. Like Gerontion 
who casts his mind upon an impenetrable and treacherous 
history searching for some order, Adams had attempted to 
find answers in history, trying to find a unifying 
principle that would generate some order out of what
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appeared to be a numbing chaos, an attempt that failed, 
leaving him with "his historical neck broken, 1 his mind 
waking "to find itself looking blankly into the void of 
death" (460) .
Adams's pessimism Eliot considered the effect of a 
mind removed from experience, sterile in its self- 
absorption: "It is probable that men ripen best through 
experiences that are at once sensuous and intellectual; 
certainly many men will admit that their keenest ideas have 
come to them with the quality of a sense-perception; and 
that their keenest sensuous experience has been 'as if the 
body thought.' There is nothing to indicate that Adams's 
senses either flowered or fruited: he remains little Paul 
Dombey asking questions" (362). In light of this remark, 
Denis Donoghue reads Gerontion as "a fragmented figure in 
whom ideas have long since lost connection with the 
experience of smelling a rose; a figure spiritually 
febrile, vain enough to think that history must be corrupt 
and the world incomprehensible upon no better evidence than 
that his spiritual anomie requires these notions" (Reading 
150). Suffering from what Ronald Bush calls a "sensory 
desiccation" ("I have lost my sight, smell, hearing, taste 
and touch:/How should I use them for your closer 
contact?"), Gerontion is a mind estranged from authentic 
experience, isolated from the sensory world, on the one
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hand, divorced from "'what we really are and feel, what we 
really want, and what really excites our interests,' and, 
on the other, 'the real world'" (Bush 34). Bush, comparing 
him to Tennyson's Dlysses, writes that "Gerontion presents 
himself in a landscape transformed by his own isolation, a 
psychological terrain where things he once loved have 
cooled, diminished and turned into inconveniences" (34) .
Because of his inability to make "contact" with 
experience, Gerontion's words are empty, "vacant shuttles 
weaving the wind," and it is this emptiness of rhetoric, 
unmoored from its proper object yet powerful in its 
evocation and self-deception, that seems clearly to be at 
the heart of the poem's method, which has been described as 
the construction of a theatre of words, built up by 
Gerontion to compensate for his deprivation from reality. 
The rich texture of allusion and pastiche owes its fabric 
to the words of Newman and Tennyson, Joyce, Adams, and 
■James, Tourneur, Chapman, Middleton, Jonson and 
Shakespeare, Blake, Lancelot Andrewes, and Edward 
Fitzgerald through A.C. Benson; yet it is the Jacobean 
rhetoric that most supplies Gerontion with a way of 
escaping his own inability to act or to experience the 
"intelligence" of sense.
Eliot was, at the time, especially concerned with the 
moral implications of Jacobean rhetoric, specifically with
Senecan drama, that is, with its ability to use verbal 
artifice to displace reality and to deceive one into 
confusing1 the gesture for action, the pose for moral value. 
Senecan drama, with its emphasis on declamation rather than 
on action and thus "at one remove from reality," is "all in
the word, and the word has no further reality behind it . .
. the centre of value is shifted from what the personage 
says to the way in which he says it." In contrast, in Greek 
drama, "behind the drama of words is the drama of action, 
the timbre of voice and voice, the uplifted hand or tense 
muscle, and the particular emotion. The spoken play, the 
words which we read, are symbols . . . for the acted and
felt play, which is always the real thing" ("Seneca" 7).
Gerontion displays no such "unity of thought and 
feeling, action and speculation" embodied in Greek drama; 
instead, he seems to be an expression of an ethic "which
supplied the lack of moral habits by a system of moral
attitudes and poses" ("Seneca" 13). So Gerontion's 
laments, his grievances and his supplications, made up as 
they are from the texture of Jacobean and Elizabethan 
rhetoric, are a "matter of postures" that weave the wind, 
seeking to fill the void. Denis Donoghue sees this attempt 
as a symptom of an egotism that "would issue in a self- 
regarding style, for which the readiest examples are 
available in Jacobean smoke and sulphur . . . Nearly any
smoke and sulphur would do, provided they provoked the 
vaunting eloquence which works as a substitute for the 
action it should accompany and define" (Reading 150). For 
Donoghue, Gerontion, "transfixed between a real action he 
is not resolute enough to take and the vacant gesture that 
mocks it" (Reading 147), is a figure embodying Eliot's 
"appalled sense . . . of the availability of words to
provide us with specious worlds in which we may take 
refuge" (Reading 156). And take refuge he seems to through 
a process, so curious to Eliot, of self-dramatization-- 
when a character in a play becomes for a short moment aware 
of himself as character, or as Eliot states in his essay 
"Rhetoric and Poetic Drama," sees himself in a dramatic 
light" (27). Eliot had Othello in mind and Othello's 
ability in his last speech to take refuge in his own 
dramatic efficacy, thus "cheering himself up" by "turning 
himself into a pathetic figure, by adopting an aesthetic 
rather than a moral attitude, dramatising himself against 
his environment. He takes in the spectator, but the human 
motive is primarily to take in himself" ("Shakespeare" 130- 
31). Spectator in his own theatre of words, Gerontion, 
through the force of his rhetoric, turns his impotence and 
deprivation into the conditions for his moral significance. 
The hero of his own insufficiency, his rhetoric is 
sufficient to charm and move, to weave specificities of
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gesture that, because aesthetic in nature, can provide him 
with a gratification unavailable through action and genuine 
feeling.
Yet the self-consciousness necessary for his "own 
delectation" also provides an awareness of the inefficacy 
of his method, and the last passages of the poem are most 
often read as a failure of his role-playing to keep away 
the void into which the puppet-like De Bailache, Fresca, 
and Mrs. Cammel whirl--a vortex(t) in which the imaginary 
ship of his thoughts becomes caught, driven into the small 
corner reserved perhaps for the anonymous, most certainly 
the small corner of his own "dull head" from where he 
began, blowing into the husks of his own dry thoughts.
Thus, for many readers, Gerontion is both a bad poet 
and a bad historian, for this most unreliable of unreliable 
narrators embodies attitudes and methods censured by Eliot 
in his essays. Essay after essay attacking the excesses of 
rhetoric, the division of mind from experience and word 
from sense, and the failure to construct unifying wholes 
are assembled against the speaker of this poem. In his 
inability to unify the present and the past, Gerontion is 
considered both an "uncritical historian" and an "imperfect 
critic" (See Longenbach Modernist Poetics 189-93) . His 
inability to impose, as Eliot puts it, "a credible order 
upon ordinary reality . . . thereby eliciting some
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perception of an order in reality, to bring us to a
condition of serenity, stillness, and reconciliation" marks
him, for many readers, as a bad artist (OPP 94). But for 
Gerontion to be this "imperfect critic" of his times, one 
must assume a psychological and dramatic coherence, 
minimizing the subversion of the dramatic monologue's 
determinates of speaker, scene and narration.
The opening passage would seem to support a
tangibility of voice and scene:
Here I am, an old man in a dry month 
Being read to by a boy, waiting for rain.
X was neither at the hot gates 
Nor fought in the warm rain
Nor knee deep in the salt marsh, heaving a cutlass.
Bitten by flies, fought.
My house is a decayed house,
And the jew squats on the window sill, the owner,
Spawned in some estaminet of Antwerp,
Blistered in Brussels, patched and peeled in London.
The goat coughs at night in the field overhead;
Rocks, moss, stonecrop, iron, merds.
The woman keeps the kitchen, makes tea,
Sneezes at evening, poking the peevish gutter.
X an old man,
A dull head among windy spaces.
The easy conversational tone of the opening gives a 
certain concreteness of scene, introduced by the solidness 
of the "Here," opposing where he was not. So an old man 
waiting for rain, being read to, meditates on the past, in 
some proximity to a decayed house which harbors both a mean 
domesticity and a servant who keeps the kitchen, while a 
goat coughs outside and the slumlord leans on the window
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sill on a warm, dry night. Such a summary, however, is 
misleading, for the language contains strong, if 
indefinite, allegorical potentialities that choke off any 
such tangibility. The references to past wars, wrapped 
within the context of dryness and decay, as well as the 
linking of the contemporary commercial cities of Antwerp, 
Brussels, and London to an anti-Semitic cultural diagnosis, 
immediately conjure the recent war and its aftermath,
Europe in 1919--politically ruined, spiritually confused, 
and growingly anti-Semitic, as indicated by the link 
between the jew and the debased commercialism symbolized by 
the capitals. The house is both the house of Europe and its 
mind; it is both mind and grave. The goat coughs overhead 
on a windy hill ("a windy knob") or as Capricorn, in 
constellated regions of the sky, suggesting an astrological 
disturbance in which rolls the catalogue of "Rocks, moss, 
stonecrop, merds." But disturbances here are grammatical. 
Gabriel Pearson marks how the "swift aggressive flurry of 
strong verbs" creates "an impression of inflicted 
retaliations . . . the 'Jew' placarded, as owner, on an 
appositional sill, being spattered, degraded and mutilated" 
("T. S. Eliot" 87). Yet witness how the "blistered," 
"patched," and "peeled" can apply equally to the house or 
to the jew, and indeed the tonal qualities of the language 
here work beyond referential scope, achieving a "half­
life," somewhere between image and reference. The strange, 
cosmopolitan tableaux of the unidentified Mr. Silvero, 
Hakagawa, Madame de Tornquist and Fraulein von Kulp takes 
place not in the house of the opening scene but in some 
obscure sinister past, where insomnia and cultural faux-pas 
join the tryst and the seance to contribute to what Kenner 
calls an "epiphany of guilty terror" (Invisible 130). 
Meaning here is primarily the effect of a language of 
gesture: Erik Svarny notes that "phonetic and rhythmic 
effects" of the "Jonsonian 'humorous' naming" serve "to 
imply that these•individuals have no particular 
significance beyond the rudimentary identity of the names 
they bear" <182). Any potential narrative function that 
they have is further arrested by the warp and weft of the 
parallel participles "Who walked .../ bowing .../ Shifting 
.../who turned," turned indeed into "Vacant Shuttles [that] 
weave the wind."
By the end of the poem the scene will switch from 
cogitations in a "draughty house" to a farcical explosion 
of more "Jonsonian" characters whirling into the same 
universe where constellated goats once coughed and 
constellated bears now shudder, whirling above the sea, 
both ocean and gulf, where the old man, both an unfit 
mariner and gull, is driven by winds that are both warm
("the Trades") and cold ("feathers in the snow"), a 
universe of cartographical nonsense.
The instability of scene could be meliorated by the 
pattern of either a conversation or a meditation of a 
character, but along with the confusion of physical and 
mental landscapes, the speaker's dramatic coherence 
deteriorates, and the organizing principle of the verse 
paragraphs seems less a matter of a speaker's volition than 
of a figurative logic carried by the allusive properties of 
words, which seem to achieve an independent life of their 
own. Thus the anonymous Jacobean rhetoric that intrudes in 
the sixth verse paragraph--for example,
Think at last 
I have not made this show purposelessly 
And it is not by any concitation 
Of the backward devils.
I would meet you upon this honestly.
I that was near your heart was removed therefrom 
To lose beauty in terror, terror in inquisition
--serves to distance and depersonalize, disconnecting the 
line between voice and speaker. So too the declarative 
sense of the lines on history is more a matter of rhythm 
than reference, for the rhythmic waves of sententiousness 
punctuated by Think's that can either hold the 
deliberateness of the imperative mood or be in the 
indicative, serve to undercut, if not obliterate, both a 
grammatical and a thinking subject. The disintegration of
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the speaker into a multiplicity of verbal modes alerts us 
to the possibility that there is no real character here, no 
one with a determinate personal history. Hugh Kenner calls 
Gerontion an "auditory illusion within the confines of 
which the components of the poem circulate and co-exist" 
(Invisible 125). Any sense of personal coherence is for 
Kenner the result of "the uniquely specifying rhythms, the 
richly explicit verbs, the syntactic muscularity of a 
sequence of declarative sentences," which "expend 
themselves in weaving the wind, their intimate narrative 
energy handling any ambiguities, phantoms, footless 
metaphors" (Invisible 127). He further insists that “the 
sense of personal presence can at any moment be resolved 
into a purely technical management of stresses and 
caesurae" (Invisible 125). And more recently, John 
Riquelme has argued that the heterogeneity of the language 
counters any impression of personal voice that the opening 
introduces, for “The grammatical indeterminacy disturbs the 
statements' coherence in ways that resist resolution"
(157). Regardless, it is difficult to give up the notion 
of a voice or a consciousness here. The “I" beckons toward 
us, simultaneously confessional and haughty; like the "I" 
of a medieval riddle, if gestures toward the allegorical 
plane, though frustrating any resolution into such 
stability. Accordingly, Riquelme notes the allegorical
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tendency: "The language pertains not to a character whose 
name indicates that he is a person but to one who is named 
artificially. Like a figure in a medieval allegory whose 
name points to a concept that is abstract and general 
rather than personal and individual, Gerontion is not a 
person but one among many possible incarnations of the 
meaning of his name in Greek, kittle old man'" (157).
To be nothing more than an etymology, however, is to 
be a great deal. Serving as the title for a poem whose 
context is a war which effectively ended a phase of Western 
culture, whose "voice" typifies historical consciousness, 
and whose method, in its echoes of literary history, 
appears to embody historical remembrance itself, Gerontion 
seems to personify the mind of a culture; hence the 
customary suggestion that Gerontion implies the "Mind of 
Europe" or historical consciousness itself (which Nietzsche 
said was "a form of congenital grayheadedness"). The phrase 
"the Mind of Europe" was of course greatly utilized by the 
modernists. One such text, Paul Valery's "Letter from 
France: The Spiritual Crisis," not only represents the 
phrase's usefulness to its period but because of striking 
similarities both in terms of subject and exposition may 
just well be a major source for Eliot's poem and if so, may 
justify the allegorical insinuations of Gerontion as some 
aspect of the "Mind of Europe."
At the request of John Middleton Murry, Paul Valery 
wrote the essay to be published first in English in two 
parts for the Athenaeum. The first part, which bears more 
directly upon Eliot's “Gerontion," was published on April 
11, 1919 and given Eliot's close relation with the journal, 
he may have read it shortly before or even upon 
commencement of the writing of the poem. There is indeed 
the similar complaint that can be found in so many 
contemporary works dealing with the war and its meaning -- 
the disillusionment with the myth of social evolution, the 
uncertainty about culture, and the accompanying fear of 
history being only a malign destiny. Yet there are 
correspondences of image and detail that seem to point to 
something more than just a shared milieu.
Valery begins his diagnosis of a European “crisis of 
mind" by first addressing the extraordinary realization: 
that Western culture may not be inherently privileged, but 
both the product and victim of “accident." Europe is 
figured as a great ship driven by the storms of war, soon 
to go down into history, here a deep sea-grave that already 
holds within its "obscure depths," the “phantoms of great 
ships laden with riches and intellect," other civilizations 
that now remind that "the abyss of history is deep enough 
to hold us all. . . . The circumstances that could send the 
works of Keats and Baudelaire to join the works of Menander
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are no longer inconceivable; they are in the newspapers. .
. . The most formidable and the best ordered can perish by
accident" (182). Besides the fragility of culture, the
war, according to Valery, disclosed the fraudulent claim of
high culture to act as an unbroken continuum of
intellectual power providing for increasing moral and
material progress. The roles of the arts, sciences, and
technology, as well as accepted moral categories, are
neither civilizing nor edifying but instrumental in the
slaughter that has taken place:
The great virtues of the German people have begotten 
more evils, than idleness ever bred vices. With our 
own eyes, we have seen conscientious labor, the most 
solid learning, the most serious discipline and 
application adapted to appalling ends.
So many horrors could not have been possible 
without so many virtues. Doubtless, much science was 
needed to kill so many, to waste so much property, 
annihilate so many cities in so short a time; but 
moral qualities in like number were also needed. Are 
Knowledge and Duty,then, suspect? (182)
Complementing the deadly possibilities of knowledge are the
contradictions inherent in the "innumerable ways of
thought, dogmas, philosophies, heterogenous ideals" that
the European "mind" embraces in a desperate attempt to
maintain "consciousness":
While inventors were feverishly searching their 
imaginations and the annals of former wars for the 
means of doing away with barbed wire, of outwitting 
submarines or paralyzing the flight of airplanes, her 
soul was intoning at the same time all the 
incantations it ever knew, and giving serious 
consideration to the most bizarre prophecies; she
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sought refuge, guidance, consolation throughout the 
whole register of her memories, past acts, and 
ancestral attitudes. Such are the known effects of 
anxiety, the disordered behavior of a mind fleeing 
from reality to nightmare and from nightmare back to 
reality, terrified, like a rat caught in a trap. (182)
The source of disorder goes beyond the war to the
intellectual disorder of modernity, which is "the free
existence, in all her cultivated minds, of the most
dissimilar ideas, the most contradictory principles of life
and learning." Consequently, beneath the detail of the
age, Valery laments, "I see . . . nothingi Nothing ... and
yet an infinitely potential nothing."
Abandoning the feminine persona and not surprisingly
the accompanying motif of hysteria, Valery changes figures:
now the mind, no longer disordered but keenly analytic, is
"an intellectual Hamlet" observing the terrain of European
history with a "terribly lucid mind":
Standing, now, on an immense sort of terrace of 
Elsinore that stretches from Basel to Cologne, 
bordered by the sands of Nieuport, the marshes of the 
Somme, the limestone of Champagne, the granites of 
Alsace ...our Hamlet of Europe is watching millions of 
ghosts." (183)
This terrace lies over the circumference of World War I's 
theatre, but the ghosts are not the ghosts of men, but the 
ghosts of "the subjects of our controversies...all the 
titles of our fame, the weight of all the discoveries and 
varieties of knowledge." Caught between "the tedium of
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rehearsing the past and the folly of always trying to 
innovate, 1 this Hamlet picks up skulls of those celebrated 
by history for their ideas, the great thinkers whose 
contributions form a chain stretching into the present 
devastation. And although the war is over, peace harbors 
more terrors than war, for peace is the condition in 
"which the natural hostility between men is manifested in 
creation... a time of creative rivalry and the battle of 
production," which in turn will precede another "dark 
passage" into war. The (Question remains, "Have I not 
exhausted my desire for radical experiment, indulged too 
much in cunning compounds?" (183)
Apropos of compounds, and at the risk of appearing 
obvious, one will of course note the resemblance between 
Valery's ship driven by a storm down into history and 
Gerontion's imaginary thought boat "driven by the Trades/
To a sleepy corner." Moreover, the seemingly aberrant 
couplings of virtues breeding vices and horrors breeding 
virtues recalls Gerontion's
Unnatural vices 
Are fathered by our heroism. Virtues 
Are forced upon us by our impudent crimes.
And Valery's question, "Are Knowledge and Duty then 
suspect?", shares with Gerontion's "After such Knowledge,
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what forgiveness?" the sad tone of the irrevocable, the 
reaching of some border which, when passed, shuts one off 
from the repose of certainty. And so follows the demand 
for certainty, in "Gerontion" the insistent demand for 
signs, portents, and wonders ("Signs are taken for 
wonders") and in Valery's Europe, the groundswell of 
disordered incantations and bizarre prophecies.
It is, however, the presentation of the mind of Europe 
as observer, overwhelmed by the shock of war, overlooking 
his rutted "body" of history that reminds one most of 
Gerontion, another observer removed from history yet 
witness to it who, like Valery's Hamlet, seems doomed to a 
historical remembrance provoked by guilt. Valery's portrait 
of European culture as a disordered mind split into 
cognitive and physiological functions resembles Eliot's 
depiction in his essays of modern European or English 
history as a "splitting up of personality." Both Valery 
and Eliot tended to impose psychological patterns on 
cultural and historical phenomena, and it was Eliot who 
personified Europe or England as a collective consciousness 
that, although once a "unified sensibility" exhibiting a 
healthy fusion of the experiential and the cognitive, had 
in the modern age "split," thought and word becoming 
dissociated from feeling (a term that Eliot always 
associated with the physiological): "in the seventeenth
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century a dissociation of sensibility set in, from which we 
have never recovered" ("Metaphysical" 64). Prior to the 
eighteenth century, "the intellect was immediately at the 
tips of the senses;1 consequently, the poetry of the time 
presented a "direct sensuous apprehension of thought, or 
recreation of thought into feeling," unlike the poetry of 
Tennyson and Browning who "do not feel their thought as 
immediately as the odour of a rose" ("Metaphysical" 64).
Valery's "mind of Europe" is split along the 
conventional gender lines of male rationality and female 
emotionalism. Before the passage on Hamlet as the intellect 
of Europe, Europe is figured as a female in the throes of 
hysteria:
An extraordinary shudder ran through the marrow of 
Europe. She felt in every nucleus of her mind that 
she was no longer the same, that she was no longer 
herself, that she was about to lose consciousness, 
a consciousness acquired through centuries of bearable 
calamities.
Later, the analytic intellect speaks as Hamlet, a 
conventional figure for the vitality of intellect at the 
expense of action, and begins his "lucid" analysis of the 
past. In "Gerontion,1 Eliot will present a sensibility 
dissociated along the lines of mind and body, the female 
relegated to act in another conventional role, to figure 
the enigmatic power of History, a bewitching if deadly 
Clio. Gerontion, "a dull head,1 separated from the physical
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springs of sensibility, observes, like Hamlet, commanding 
his mind to cogitate ("Think...think"), to seize the past 
within some design that will speak a human truth; yet it is 
a tired mind, fighting its own hebetude, overwhelmed, like 
the female Europe, by imminent senselessness (in both 
senses of the word), fighting the insensate darkness (he 
is blind) by means of a jumbled memory.
Like Valery, who perceived the war as the ultimate 
physical expression of a disordered cultural mind, Eliot 
consistently pointed to war as the political manifestation 
of this "dissociation of sensibility.1 In his discussions 
of English poetry, it is the English Civil War that 
functions as the historical marker for the "splitting up of 
personality." And the American Civil War, a war he called 
"the greatest disaster in the whole of American history," 
constituted the political expression of the cultural 
schizophrenia Eliot saw working in the American 
sensibility. The Treaty of Versailles, which ended World 
War I, a treaty Eliot, like many around him, condemned as 
dangerously flawed, marked the culmination of "the process 
of disintegration" (Notes 45). And, in 1929, when asked how 
the collapse of Western culture would manifest itself, 
Eliot's blunt response was "Internecine warfare. . . People 
killing one another in the streets” (qtd. in Spender 120).
There is a final resemblance between these two 
observers. Valery's Hamlet questions the "cunning 
compounds" of scientific knowledge and political thought 
that have led to the "fatal precision" of culture necessary 
for the occurrence of the First World War. Gerontion 
searches out the "cunning passages" of the historian's 
text, "passages" that, along with "corridors" and "issues," 
suggest the image of a labyrinth, and, given the textual 
pun on passages, it is a textual labyrinth held in a mind-- 
a mind which we have already seen as the House of Europe 
and which has its own edificial connotations. The phrase 
"cunning passages" figurally merges text and brain, sexual 
power and knowledge, a merging to which we can also add 
war, for as there are passages in texts and passages in 
houses and craniums, there are also "passages at arms." 
These passages are transfigured into "a wilderness of 
mirrors," which has evoked in some readers the construction 
or "contrivance" of the Treaty of Versailles in the Hall of 
Mirrors. We can also note Henri Bergson's definition of 
memory as "the moving mirror which continually reflects 
perception as a memory" (165) and Shelley's definition of 
poets' minds as "the mirrors of futurity." But here the 
mirrors seem shattered, their shards reflecting a 
wilderness that seems to contain both the political and the 
poetic. But we need not hurry to the heart of the poem to
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attend to the figural merging of war and word, for this 
merging occurs, albeit more indirectly, at the very opening 
of the poem, where war, the physical expression of the 
cultural suicide that has resulted in the despairing milieu 
of the poem, paradoxically becomes a trope for that from 
which Gerontion is dissociated, from experience and 
volition, and meaningful historical participation.
Gerontion opens his deliberations with memories of
past wars, memories that identify the recent war as the
motivating force behind his ruminations and that begin his
search of the past:
Here I am an old man in a dry month 
Being read to by a boy, waiting for rain.
I was neither at the hot gates
Nor fought in the warm rain
Nor knee deep in the salt marsh, heaving a
cutlass,
Bitten by flies, fought.
Although we may not be sure of where exactly Gerontion is, 
we can be, however, relatively certain of where he has not 
been: not at Thermopylae (of which the "hot gates” is a 
transliteration); not in "warm rain" and "knee-deep in the 
salt marsh,1 which suggests the swampiness of the Somme and 
Ypres Salient and which recall Pound's image of trench 
warfare ("walked eye-deep in hell"); and not clearing vague 
jungles, "heaving a cutlass" and "bitten by flies," like 
some seventeenth-century explorer or adventurer.
Most critics have read these lines as evidence of 
Gerontion's cowardice, of his distance from "real" 
experience. The lines are structured around negatives that 
maintain the speaker's absence and nonparticipation, a 
distance that certainly effects a tone of regret and 
complaint; hence, the "Here" is derisive and contrasts with 
the wistful "there" implied by the neither/nor 
construction. The references to past wars evoke heroism, 
vitality and prowess, qualities that contrast with the 
abstractedness and powerlessness of the speaker. For 
Gregory Jay, the allusions to battles, especially the 
heroism of the Greek defeat at Thermopylae, serve as 
evidence of Gerontion's distance from "historically 
meaningful action" (24). Elizabeth Drew reads "the warm 
rain" as a positive image connected to Thermopylae, "an 
active struggle of civilization against barbarians, 
refreshed, in spite of hardships, by the 'warm rain' of 
faith in a common cause" (50). For Grover Smith, the "warm 
rain" represents a "vital energy," like that of the "tropic 
luxuriance of jungles in which" Gerontion has not fought 
(64). And Robert Crawford points to the fear of inanity, 
of the horror of a "Death in Life" and the accompanying 
desire for "experience to fill the emptiness" that the 
lines illustrate (51).
69
Besides establishing Gerontion's separation from
"action" and "experience," the lines, for many of the
poem's readers, serve as evidence of Gerontion's use of
rhetoric to compensate for his deprivation. The emphatic
negatives and their insistence on absence are countermanded
by a syntax and diction that in their vigor supply an
imaginative participation that real history has denied him.
For example, in the lines
Nor knee-deep in the salt marsh, heaving a cutlass 
Bitten by flies, fought
the verb fought is radically separated from the "Nor" that
defines it, a separation comprised of one adverbial and two
participial phrases, which, replete with their caesuras,
not to mention the final verb itself, emphasize and linger
over actions never performed by the speaker in a place he
never was. The two b's and two f_'s of the last line
punctuate the sleight-of-hand.
There is general agreement, then, that a rhetorical 
performance is used to compensate for the speaker's 
declared separation from a "vital" world of experience that 
participation in history would have given him. The 
references to past wars are there because they connote the 
benefits of active engagement in history: "heroic action," 
"vital energy," and "historically meaningful action"--all 
of which Gerontion has been denied. There is, however, a
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problem with this line of thought: To associate history
with the benefits of meaningful participation and to 
associate Gerontion's rhetoric'with the consolations of 
style is circular because the vitality accruing to history 
in this context has only so accrued because of Gerontion's 
grand rhetoric itself, which invests past wars with an 
exoticism and heroic appeal not so much present in the 
experience of war as in traditional representations of war. 
The "vital energy" of warm rain in a poem may inspire faith 
but in a fly-infested marsh or jungle inspires malarial 
fever, in the trenches of the Somme, foot-rot, and at 
Passchendaele, (for thousands) the opportunity to drown in 
mud. And the reality of being cut down at Thermopylae may 
have lacked the thrill of dying bravely at the rhetorically 
heated "hot gates." The lines are not so much references 
to past wars but rather references to the literary record 
cultural memory keeps.
History in the opening lines is not the arena of 
"meaningful action” from which Gerontion is absent; rather, 
it is, in its etymological sense of "story," the textual 
record of exemplary deeds transmitted through the romance 
of the chronicler, who more often than not invests the 
remote past with a glory that indicts the sordidness of the 
present. Gerontion, here, is not so much the chronicler as 
he is a listener and surveyor of the texts of history. We
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do not know what the boy reads to Gerontion, but read he 
does, maybe of "The old music of bygone singers, rich 
haunting sentences of old leisurely authors" that "rang" in 
the brain of Edward Fitzgerald, whose biography by A. C. 
Benson stands as a source for the opening two lines1. Just 
as that old music came "unbidden" to Fitzgerald's pen, the 
old music of war comes unbidden to Gerontion, who begins to 
weave his text from the past made out of words. That is how 
the past survives in Gerontion's mind: not in deeds but in 
words.
This may explain the peculiar effect of the images of
war of the opening lines--the opposing forces of absence
and presence, of being not there yet there. The lines, as
Robert Crawford has shown, echo those of another speaker,
also removed from the heroics of war, the speaker in James
Thompson's poem, "Memoir," who complains
1 fret 'neath gnat-stings, an ignoble prey 
While others with a sword-hilt in their grasp 
Have warm rich blood to feed their latest gasp 
(qtd. in Crawford 50).
But the striking element of Eliot's lines is the
positioning of the speaker relative to these wars. While in
1 Benson, describing the elderly FitzGerald, wrote: 
"Here he sits, in a dry month, old and blind, being read to 
by a country boy, longing for rain. FitzGerald's mind was 
like the magic isle--'Full of noises,/ Sounds and sweet airs 
that give delight and hurt not.' The old music of bygone 
singers, rich haunting sentences of old leisurely authors, 
rang in his brain, and came unbidden to his pen" (141-142) .
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Thompson's lines the separation of the speaker from 
military adventure is clear, in Eliot's lines the speaker 
is ambiguously both there and here.
On the one hand, the "I was neither" clause denotes 
distance, but it also establishes a pre-existence, that 
Gerontion's consciousness is as old as the events where he 
was not. Indeed, like the Tiresias of The Waste Land, who, 
if not for Pound's surgical skill, would have been another 
incarnation of Gerontion, Gerontion has, as Harvey Gross 
puts it, "total recall; he was witness to the birth of 
Christ and he is spectator at the downfall of the West.
His personality merges with historical figures and with 
characters from the history of literature. He speaks with 
the words of Edward Fitzgerald, the blind translator of the 
Rubaiyat, or in the iambic rhetoric of the Jacobean 
tragedians" (34) . Yet we are told that he was not there, 
never experienced the quixotic gestes that his memory 
evokes.
To be not there yet there. Is this not the bitter 
effect of memory, both psychological and cultural, which 
Plutarch described as "the hearing of deaf actions, and the 
seeing of blind?" The mind can hold the past within its 
consciousness, vicariously enjoy its plot yet be helpless 
before the enchantment of its discourse and its 
irrevocability. Gerontion, like Othello, sees himself in a
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dramatic light, doubling as both spectator and actor, 
because, as in a dream, he holds a past within his 
consciousness that weaves a sentence he cannot control, 
cannot suspend. The substitution of the epigraph from 
Shakespeare's Measure for Measure for the original Dante 
epigraph tells us much about where Eliot wanted to put 
emphasis.
Ronald Bush tells us of a canceled epigraph of an 
early typescript: "Come '1 mio corpo stea/nel mondo su, 
nulla scienza porto" ("How my body stands in the world 
above, I have no knowledge"). The line is from Dante's 
Inferno XXXIII, where Fra Alberigo explains that because he 
betrayed his guests, his soul was delivered to hell, 
leaving his living body to move about on earth. A perfect 
epigraph for the desiccated figure of Gerontion, “a dull 
head." But the epigraph from Measure for Measure changes 
the emphasis from complete division of mind and body to an 
emphasis on the dreamer, who does not experience division 
but d6doub1ement (to use a word of which Eliot was fond), 
one self becoming two, the dreamer dreaming and the dreamer 
dreamt: "Thou hast nor youth nor age/ But as it were an 
after dinner sleep dreaming of both." The lines are spoken 
by the Duke in Measure for Measure, who, disguised as a 
humble friar, counsels a young man facing execution to 
disinvest himself of the world, to look at life
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disinterestedly, such as in a dream in which youth and age, 
the past and the future, the beginning and the end, are 
held by the disinterested eguipoise of one with eyes on 
heaven and immortality rather than on this mutable world. 
The austerity of the Duke's godly but cold oratory is 
comically meliorated by the audience's knowledge that at 
any moment, like Christ, who comes back like a "thief in 
the night," the Duke can shed his disguise, resume his 
abandoned office as magistrate, and dispense a merciful 
justice.
In "Gerontion," the execution has already taken place 
in the form of World War I, and the intercession of justice 
means the wrath of Christ, whose imminent return hangs in 
the poem as an eschaton: "The tiger springs in the new 
year/us he devours." indeed, apocalyptic imagery haunts the 
poem. The winds that blow through the poem lead to the 
disintegration of the cosmopolis, where, as Gross 
describes, "Through an Einsteinian metamorphosis these 
people are changed from mass to energy, their scattered 
substance blown by the cold winds of space" (41). Nature 
and history hurtle further and further into chaos and, 
ultimately, into "fractured atoms," just as the second law 
of thermodynamics and Pearson's kinetic theory of gas 
indicated--two theories which led to Henry Adams' own 
apocalyptic vision.
Gerontion's "dream" is not then the drowsy contentment 
of the after-dinner sleep but a fitful delirium of thought 
in which "youth and age," the past and present coalesce 
into an eschatological nightmare that closes into the mind. 
In a way, the violent end of history that Gerontion fears 
has already occurred since there is no longer any room for 
action or deed; the narrative stream of history remains 
suspended within the mind as memory repeats the forms by 
which humankind has attempted to order and thus understand 
history--history as Herodotian record of epic deeds, as 
nature's cyclical pattern of birth and death, and history 
as teleological process, moving toward some purposeful, or 
blind, end. All are part of the wind that weaves the 
vacant shuttles. In this poem, the winds of history that 
drive Gerontion's boat are also the winds of a discourse 
disengaged from its proper object, almost as if once 
history has ended it can only remain in the words of the 
past, now vestiges that the words of the present can only 
trace, the dead Word's faint emanations: "The word within a 
word, unable to speak a word,/Swaddled with darkness." 
Lancelot Andrewes' description of Verbum lnfans--"The Word 
without a word; the aeternall Word not hable to speake a 
word" (85)--is transformed into the absent center at the 
heart of language, verbal dissociations parallel cultural 
and psychic ones.
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Although the images of war in the opening lines 
suggest a concrete action or a "reality" of historical deed 
denied the inactive speaker, they are no more than a 
function of Gerontion's rhetoric, a rhetoric not present 
because of compensation, that is, because of an 
individual's withdrawal from a reality or from history, but 
because reality itself has withdrawn from language. Like a 
dreamer dreaming, Gerontion is transfixed between a passive 
spectatorship and the dreamt stage of history upon which he 
never moved, because it was never really there, or if 
there, there only in the form of figures and masks of 
language, that, given present conditions, mock the present.
Gerontion has no ghosts, ghosts which for Eliot and
Valery, as well as for Ezra Pound, represented the living
presence of tradition and history. In Valery's essay,
Kamlet is haunted by "millions of ghosts." in Three Cantos,
Pound writes, “Ghosts move about me/ Patched with
histories." But for Gerontion, there are no ghosts, only
the bodies of texts that form the body of History, the
alluring body of a guileful woman:
History has many cunning passages, contrived corridors 
And issues, deceives with whispering ambitions.
Guides us by vanities. Think now
She gives when our attention is distracted
And what she gives, gives with such supple confusions
That the giving famishes the craving. Gives too late
What's not believed in, or if still believed,
In memory only, reconsidered passion.
The drive to understand history, the desire to find the 
center of History's labyrinth is described in sexual terms 
and the failure in terms of the impotence and unfulfilled 
cravings of epistemophilic endeavors, a carnality which 
extends into the corrupt atmosphere of Jacobean intrigue 
suggested by the imagery. History plays the conventional 
courtesan suitable to the conspiracies of palace galleries, 
to the whispers of the ambitious and the self-serving who 
populate the violent corridors of Jacobean revenge tragedy.
Corridors of history can also be actual corridors-- 
such as the Polish corridor "contrived" by the Treaty of 
Versailles--and, as such, blend the conspiracy of palace 
politics with the geographical carvings World War I 
effected. And there is another corridor that comes to mind, 
the corridor that Valery alludes to in reporting the 
peripheral points of Hamlet's terrace: the war corridor of 
the trenches, which stretched from Belgium to Switzerland. 
Although we think of the trenches as making up one 
continuous, seamless line, they were, like History's 
labyrinth, actually maze-like, made up of 25,000 miles of 
complex corridors, linked by communication traverses, that 
zig-zagged, forcing the soldiers to turn and twist their 
way through the lines (Fussell 42). Circuitously moving at 
night and stumbling over unknown objects in the dead- 
littered neutral ground between enemy trenches was much
like weaving one's way through a dark maze. As T. E. Hulme
said in his diary, the neutral ground was "practically
never seen by anyone in the daylight . . . it's full of
dead things, dead animals here & there, dead unburied
animals, skeletons of horses destroyed by shell fire. It's
curious to think of it later on in the war, when it will
again be seen in the daylight" (167). Movement through the
dark was "always in the same direction" and over "definite
paths." Hulme reported one of these paths "led right over
the chest of a dead peasant (Belgian)" (169). In 1915,
after a conversation with Hulme, Ezra Pound recreated
Hulme's wartime experience, writing in a poem.
To and fro, from the lines.
Men walk as on Picadilly,
Making paths in the dark
lines which concluded with
My mind is a corridor. The minds about me are 
corridors.
Nothing suggests itself. There is nothing to do but 
keep on.
(qtd. in Longenbach Cottage 125)
If not but for the resoluteness of the last sentence, these 
lines could have been spoken by Gerontion, whose labyrinth 
of history fuses, as we have seen, cerebral arenas with 
political and military ones.
Yet, although the vertiginous allusiveness of the 
language in "Gerontion" holds the contemporaneity of the
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War in its textures, the words resist referential
engagement with it; indeed, any referential engagement that
they have seems anchored, at the expense of the modern
context, in the world of Jacobean revenge drama. Stephen
Spender recognizes the suitable correspondence between the
"decadence, violence, intrigues, villainy and deviousness
of the Jacobean world of corridors and mirrors" to the
Europe of the Treaty of Versailles; but Spender has
challenged this parallel as being one inadequately
constructed and insufficiently illuminating. First, he
argues that Eliot allows himself to be carried away by the
Jacobean analogy so thoroughly that "the parallel of the
post-Elizabethan disillusionment, with its haunted decayed
poetry, takes over the poem" (63). Second, he argues that,
even if the Jacobean method had been suitably restrained,
there is another problem:
If the second half of "Gerontion" doesn't really 
convince on the levels of imagination or of 
intellectual argument, this is because the attempt to 
draw a parallel between Jacobean plays about political 
intrigues at small Italian courts and the situation of 
Europe at the time of the signing of the Treaty of 
Versailles doesn't work. The modern political theme, 
which affects the whole world, is being forced through 
too narrow a channel. The sinister backstairs post- 
Elizabethan atmosphere is hypnotic rather than 
illuminating. Critics have suggested that “contrived 
corridors" and, some lines later, "a wilderness of 
mirrors" are images suggested by the intrigues of the 
peacemakers in 1918 in the Versailles Hall of Mirrors 
to establish a "Polish corridor." If this is so, it 
seems less silly to say that the Polish corridor and 
the Versailles mirrors put a Jacobean poetic thought
80
in Eliot's head than that the pastiche Jacobean poetry
significantly evokes the Europe of Clemenceau and
Lloyd George (64-65).
To argue that the Jacobean world is an unsuitable analogy 
for the modern context is to assume, even demand, an 
intentional neatness of boundaries between tenor and 
vehicle that does not apply here or to much of Eliot's 
poetry. Furthermore, Eliot does not need to restrain "the 
haunted, decayed" poetic effects because the logic of the 
passage lies not in the drawing of a parallel between past 
and modern contexts but in allowing the "hypnotic" to 
overwhelm the "illuminating" to such an extent that the 
constructive impulse of the poetry is foregrounded at the 
expense of the subject, however morally compelling. The 
engagement with the Jacobean world is more a matter of 
engaging with the voluptuous eloquence of Elizabethan and 
Jacobean blank verse, with its exploitation of the figural 
and tonal resources of words, and its construction of a 
"theatre of words" rather than it is an engaging with the 
visual properties of its subject. Analogical lines here 
do not link "worlds"--Tourneur's stage evoking the Europe 
of 1919--as much as they link the "method" or poetic 
strategies of Elizabethan and Jacobean verse drama with the 
nature of Gerontion's voice and mind--a voice that, as we 
have seen, enacts and is enacted by what Giles Gunn would
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call "scriptable and iconographical forms, 1 and a mind that 
as Mind of Europe is mesmerized by the aesthetic force of 
such forms.
Eliot's censure of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
verse drama masked, though not very well, great admiration 
and recognition of its influence on his poetry. Its 
enchantment with the incantatory potential of language and 
its gluttony for the sensational were problematic 
tendencies that Eliot found in his own verse. Hugh Kenner 
first a r g u e d  that "Gerontion" was an exercise in purgation 
for Eliot, exploiting as it does the poetic tradition that 
began with the Elizabethans and culminated in the poetry of 
Swinburne (which Eliot attacked as a poetry of 
"hallucination”), a tradition that Kenner defines as 
presenting a "world in which poetic effects are inclined to 
glide succulently down among words, looking like sleep, 
proffering the reader a strong toil of grace; in which the 
poet more or less consciously capitalizes on the abundance 
in English, of words which, like 'toil' and 'grace,' 
incorporate barely differentiated the force of verb, noun, 
and adjective simultaneously, and so discourage a sentence 
from going unambiguously about its business" (invisible 
135). The power of Elizabethan and Jacobean verse drama 
lies, for Kenner, in its ability to "transfigure the 
visible," to turn the drabness of its stage and the paucity
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of its theatrical effects into an aural feast for the mind.
In keeping with Eliot's critique of the ability of such a
use of words to remove one from experience, in their tonal
and figural potential to create artificial worlds and
artificial feelings, Kenner thus presents "Gerontion" as a
"theatre of words", a "wilderness of glass" cut like the
"aphrodisiac glasses" of Sir Epicure Mammon, which are
Cut in more subtle angles to disperse 
And multiply my image as I walk 
Naked between my succubae;
The connections between the Hall of Mirrors and aphrodisiac
glasses (and, for that matter, Bergson's moving mirrors of
memory and Shelley's "mirrors of futurity") are not as
tenuous as may first appear.
The moral complication of Jacobean rhetoric, for 
Eliot, involved more than words creating artificial worlds 
and artificial feelings, removing their listeners from the 
"real world of experience." Its pathology also lay in the 
ability of words to enclose the violent, the corrupt, or 
the barbaric within their forms, making their contents an 
"affair of pungent sauces" palatable to the aesthetic 
taste. Eliot's attack on the Elizabethans for their 
morbidity, their disillusionment, and their lack of a moral 
"system" always involved the accompanying attack on their 
"sensationalism" and their "artistic greediness, their
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desire for every sort of effect together*' ("Dramatists" 
116-17).
This troubling entanglement of eloquence and 
corruption parallels the entanglement of war and word in 
"Gerontion," where the "cunning passages" of the Mind of 
Europe are disordered narratives of desire and power which 
formally enclose the violence of historical content. 
Renouncing the force of history as a force linked to 
political and moral conflict (much like Valery's Hamlet), 
Gerontion embraces defeat and physical dissolution, seeking 
in the closure of history, through the stance of 
spectatorship, a marginalization and thus an exclusion from 
its barbarities. Valery's Hamlet is isolated from 
culpability by his reputed faint-heartedness, Gerontion by 
his nonparticipation in battle. Because Gerontion is but a 
cipher of history, his attempt to separate himself from 
history, his attempt to be an observer of it, can only be 
done by doubling, as we have seen, into nonparticipant and 
combatant, spectator and actor, dreamer and dream, 
cogitating mind and the concupiscent body of history; yet 
this detachment is compromised by a rhetoric whose 
brilliance lies in a ventriloquism that throws the 
violations of history into its textures, exciting "the 
membrane," holding the mind captive to the drama of its own 
drama, its own theatre of war.
CHAPTER THREE 
THE WASTE LAND; WAR AND THE DISCOURSE OF QUOTATION
"We can only say that it appears likely that poets in 
our civilization, as it exists at present, must be 
difficult. Our civilization comprehends great variety 
and complexity, and this variety and complexity, 
playing upon a refined sensibility, must produce 
various and complex results. The poet must become more 
and more comprehensive, more allusive, more indirect, 
in order to force, to dislocate if necessary, language 
into his meaning." (248 SB)
Throughout his essays, Eliot consistently argued for 
the existence of an indelible connection between literary 
practice and its social context, although the exact nature 
of such a relation is unclear. The above statement, for 
example, would seem to set matters straight by its relating 
formal to social complexity, yet the statement moves 
simultaneously in two directions: (1) Comprehensiveness, 
allusiveness, and indirection force a dislocation of 
language so as to accurately reflect and thus participate 
in a culture that can only understand its own complex 
idiom; or (2) because of the determinations of this pre­
existing idiom on both personality and medium, the poet 
must move through it, dislocating, forcing, effecting a 
formal violence to capture meaning, "his meaning," not 
necessarily one articulated by his culture and thereby
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possibly reactive and resistant. Therefore, formal method 
both reflects and transcends external complexities.
Of course, it is The Waste Land, along perhaps with 
the Cantos and Mauberley, which came to be seen and, 
despite (or perhaps because of) its domestication and with 
its teeth pulled, continues to be seen as the model example 
of an experiment in the adeguation of form to modernity, an 
experiment which continues to elicit controversy over the 
relation between its formal and its socio-political 
discontinuities. The form of Eliot's attempt "to force" 
and "to dislocate" the language to reflect and yet resist 
the historical violence of the war and the resulting 
cultural disintegration is anamorphic because its 
discontinuities actualize cultural disorders and at the 
same time serve as a strategy to transcend those disorders 
through the search for a new kind of patterning.
And readers have indeed taken up the search. As James 
Knapp observes, most readings of the poem have directly 
argued or assumed that "the necessary dislocations of 
poetic language not only mirror the present state of 
civilization but reflect the poet's urgent need to 
intervene, through a choice of significant form, in the 
apparent disorders of history" (39). And, again, most 
readings point to irony as the method by which the very 
symptoms of the cultural disease are used to transcend the
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disease--a kind of homeopathic poetics. Thus, in these 
readings the statement "These fragments I have shored 
against my ruins" indicates the poet's attempt to redeem 
the apparent ruins of a culture's tradition by recomposing 
its broken forms into organic unities that will resist 
outside chaos. So, in this view, his "heap of broken 
images," reminiscent of Gerontion's "wilderness of glass," 
becomes in the poem's last section rubble from which the 
poet sorts fragments, as Jonathan Bishop describes, "like 
some king after a defeat, to assemble fragments of that 
tradition which amounts for him to an equivalent of a 
scattered demesne" (172).
Early commentators, following the poet's lead, have 
sorted rubble for the soundings of unities that recompose 
the broken forms--narrative unities (e.g., Grail legends, 
fertility myths, double-sexed, blind prophets) all 
faithfully supplied in accordance with the Notes' 
directions, or organic ones, like Joseph Frank's argument 
for a spatial logic that subsumes any temporal structure. 
War, in these readings, is consistently read as a 
historical counterpart to, if not cause of, the conditions 
of the waste land--whether those conditions be linguistic 
indeterminacy, cultural chaos, or psychological 
fragmentation--and so stands outside of the normal cultural 
production of signs as a wolf at the door. This assumes
that war is a phenomenon that works outside of culture, 
generating a violence that both creates the possibility of 
culture yet allows for its destruction. As Tadusz Slawek 
has pointed out, this distancing of war from culture leads 
in humanist discourse to the "paradox of fragile cultural 
values surrounded by a thick stratum of phenomena 
threatening but, at the same time, formative to those 
values." So he argues that war, in this view, stands in 
"dangerously dialectical opposition" to culture, for it 
precedes culture, standing outside of it as a formlessness 
that periodically bursts through, leveling and privileging 
(309) . To write poetry in the waste land is to rebuild, 
again, the destroyed cultural house, absorbing 
discontinuities, which, as Knapp states, may be terrifying 
in society but "become, when reenacted as art, the means to 
perceive a new order impervious to anything outside itself" 
(40) .
But perceiving this new order has been problematic, 
for the heterogeneous text invites multiple meanings and 
readings, a multiplicity accelerated by the publication of 
The Waste Land's manuscripts. Complicating the established 
boundaries of interpretation, the manuscripts served as 
evidence that The Waste Land was the product not only of a 
"shoring" but also a "storing" up of miscellaneous work 
going back as far as 1914, years before Eliot knew of
Jessie Weston's work or before he had read Frazer. The 
discovery of these manuscripts led to a new awareness of 
the complexity of Eliot's addition of the Notes. Before the 
publication of the manuscripts, Eliot's pronouncements on 
the centrality of Tiresias' consciousness and on the 
structural importance of the romance narrative to the poem 
had supplied early readers with a framework to arrange the 
dissonant relations of its fragments. However, the early 
draft, titled "He Do the Police in Different Voices," took 
attention away from such mythic narratives, since it showed 
that if there were any primary plan, Eliot was thinking 
more in terms of writing an urban satire in the tradition 
of Pope, Dryden and Dickens. Moreover, the exact extent, 
if not the intent, of Ezra Pound's editing was made 
apparent and complicated affairs since the fabric of the 
text now included the presence of more than one hand (and 
if we count Vivien Eliot's, then the presence of more than 
two) .
With the publication of Eliot's dissertation and the 
recent accessibility of his student papers and notebooks, a 
new appreciation of how far Eliot anticipated many 
assumptions and concerns of current literary theory has led 
readers of The waste Land away from seeking "to recuperate" 
the poem's ostensible incoherence toward studying the way 
the poem enacts its own provisionality, manifesting and yet
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displacing meanings that seem drawn from that mysterious 
plane Eliot described both in the earlier and later stages 
of bis career: the "indefinite extent, 1 a space of 
adventure and failure, "the frontiers of consciousness 
beyond which words fail, yet meanings still exist" (OPP 22- 
23) .
The most recent work on Eliot has emphasized the 
importance of this issue of the credibility or contingency 
of language in The Waste Land. Harriet Davidson reads the 
poem as a phenomenological investigation of absence, 
Jonathan Bishop as a formal articulation of the guestion of 
linguistic credibility, William Harmon and Denis Donoghue, 
the conflict between the inarticulate noise and the 
logocentric Word, and most recently, John Paul Riguelme who 
argues that "In The Waste Land, Eliot evokes writing7s 
potential for undermining voice and self by using styles of 
speaking and even apparently lyrical language in ways that 
involve disfiguration and the loss of speech and that 
reveal the poem's written, constructed, rather than spoken, 
spontaneous character" (181). The way that the poem 
foregrounds this "constructiveness," its "written-ness," 
calls attention to hermeneutic processes involving the 
reader in the textual process itself--duplicating our 
search to decipher what always remains in part an 
indecipherable world.
The poem has been called an "unstable" or "incomplete" 
allegory about writing poetry in the wasteland of 
modernity--most fittingly because The Waste Land can be 
read as modern allegory or, to use Angus Fletcher's phrase, 
a "decapitated allegory," meaning that, although retaining 
the figurative gestures of allegory, the poem is 
dispossessed of a vital, culturally approved system of 
reference, a transcendent origin or paradigm which it longs 
for, and its fragmentary form can be read as a succession 
of attempts to generate and to reach the stability of such 
a paradigm. In The Waste Land, we can find this succession 
of attempts not in the juxtaposition of static, discrete 
fragments that refuse to cohere, but in the stratagem of 
citation, which Jonathan Bishop persuasively argues is the 
essential form of the poem--a poem whose intertextual 
enigmas, produced through the citation of multiple 
discourses both linguistic and extra-linguistic, draw its 
readers into its own interrogation of language.
The urgency of the poem's interrogation of language 
arises out of a historical situation which has disclosed 
the nature of war to be not a formless opposite of culture, 
precedent to its formation, but a product of and thus a 
form of culture, which in turn generates new cultural 
signs, or as Slawek puts it, "turns signs of the 
constructive into signs of the destructive," depriving
91
other cultural signs of their "innocence," revealing that 
formal violence is not completely separate from other forms 
of culturally engendered violence (309) . Throughout The 
Waste Land, the grounds for the expected opposition between 
war and poetry erode by means of the subterfuge of 
citation, which in its shattering of the continuum of 
tradition and its discourses and in the resulting 
proliferation of voices, tongues, and provisional contexts 
exposes a vision whose horrors defy the power of language. 
The contextual interpenetration of war and literary 
construction, which citation provides, exposes at least one 
of these horrors: the intimate relations, antagonistic yet 
collusive, between cultural iniquities and art.
Eliot's use of citation, as has often been noted, took 
a revolutionary form, radicalizing what had traditionally 
been a conservative mode. According to George Steiner, 
allusion, or quotation, and its close cousins of parody and 
pastiche, invoked, during much of the course of Western 
poetry, "the fully declared but unsaid codes and presences" 
of a culture of "civility," a canon formed and generated by 
the interplay of Christian and classical lines, which "very 
largely generated and organized the shapes of western 
public speech and personal identity among the educated" 
(Difficulty 7-8). Citation, drawing on this canon of 
shared value and reference, served to authorize, as well as
to elucidate (seemingly), the poem making use of it. Erik 
Svarny states that, innocent of Eliot's procedures of 
"abortive classicism," the neo-classical poet, for example, 
would have used quotation to clarify his meaning, mediating 
between audience and poem in an attempt "to restrict his 
sources to a consistent range of material which in theory 
at least, would be shared and respected by the poet and his 
educated public (the individual poet counterpointing his 
gifts against a traditional frame of reference)" (162).
Eliot's use of citation, however, serves to ironize, 
on multiple levels, tradition's relation to his poem, for 
while his elaborate citations draw an oftentimes 
distracting attention to literary history, which would seem 
to elevate its authority and importance, they only serve to 
testify to its failure. Tradition itself appears exploded 
info shards and traces of past, now alien, value, like the 
cities "Burst[ing] in the violet air" of "What the Thunder 
Said." Indeed, the most obvious link between the experience 
of war and the poem lies in the poem's vision of tradition 
as an inherited order that has been left in ruins, a vision 
which accounts for the strong sense of elegy in the poem. 
Steiner, pointing to the importance of elegy to modernism, 
writes, "The archival energies of Joyce, of Eliot, of 
Pound, the many-layered structures of allusion which 
characterize their work, are a ceremony of mourning for
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resources once naturally accessible to writer and reader in 
the contract of culture" (9).
In response to this sense of elegy in the poem, we may 
read the poem, if we like, as the poet's attempt to 
reconstruct tradition, to re-invent literary history, by 
reconciling what has become dispersed and thus disparate 
material into an order achieved through a private aesthetic 
standard. Although citation may even more easily uphold 
tradition than subvert it, matters in The Waste Land are 
more complicated because, as (Jonathan Bishop has 
demonstrated, Eliot's "discourse by quotation" refers not 
only to past literary works but extends to the "re­
collecting" of past experience, real or imaginary, private 
or dramatic, as in the fragmented narratives of "The Game 
of Chess" and "The Fire Sermon" and even to the citation of 
extra-linguistic discourses. The cockney chat of the pub 
and the soldier's song concerning Mrs. Porter function, 
according to Bishop, as citations of the "unconscious 
rhythms of popular speech," "a communal analogue to the 
recollection of traditional verses" (157). The recalling 
of the conversation in the Hofgarten and of the Hyacinth 
girl is a "psychic quotation" from some private, individual 
past, which when verbally "recollected" seems to elude full 
presentation, remaining fragmentary and enigmatic in its 
distance. They are, according to Bishop, "the private
analogue to fragments from other poems1 (157). And then 
there are the incomplete narratives, the unfinished tales 
of the unhappy upper-class husband and wife, the 
conversation at the Pub, and Tiresias' vision of the typist 
and the "carbuncular" clerk. Because of their fragmentary 
structure and the disembodied qualities of the speakers, 
they seem to be cited from other sources, and Bishop 
reminds us of that peculiar quality of Eliot's dramatism, 
that "he is inclined rather to listen to, almost to 
'quote,' the words of others than to put them clearly on 
stage" (162). At the same time, but in contrast to the 
talk of the poem, the recollected language of poems, 
performance, and elegy, stands what William Harmon has 
called the "idiom of the inarticulate"--music, noises, 
babble, and "creaturely sounds." The "water-dripping song" 
of the hermit thrush is cited as a literal "Drip, drop," 
the "inviolable voice" of the nightingale as a "Jug JUg," a 
"Twit Twit Tereu," the cock's annunciation, rich in 
religious symbolism, incarnated into 1 co co rico, " and 
Wagnerian lyric translated as "Weialala leia."
This juxtaposition and interplay of multiple 
discourses reveal just how far quotation has lost its 
usual ancillary role. Here, it overwhelms the expected 
expository or narrative continuum of the text, overwhelming 
even the coherence of the poet's voice. The opposition,
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set up by Eliot's note on Tiresias and by the poem's 
original title, between a unifying voice and a diversity of 
voices does not ease the difficulty of tracing the 
relationship between quoted voices and the "unifying 
consciousness" of the poet. When so much seems quoted, the 
multiplication of voice turns the poet himself into a 
cubist-like face of intersecting quotations. But more than 
ventriloquist, a popular figure given the original title, 
the poet plays collector, assembling from ruined memorials 
of private and cultural codes a collection as capricious as 
any private collection.
As regards the poem's method of quotation, there is, 
on the one hand, a struggle to build up a destroyed 
cultural inheritance, the quoted fragments being signs of 
its defeated history and the babble of multiple discourses 
being a sign of the impossibility of reaching the 
sustenance of antecedent contexts through the exhausted 
resources of language; on the other hand, however, 
quotation does violence to the force of tradition, 
juxtaposing miscellaneous textures from past and present 
discourse as a means of subverting the order of 
tradition. The figure of the collector is therefore 
relevant because his activity, as Walter Benjamin 
recognized, both preserves and destroys the past. Despite 
acute ideological differences between Eliot and Benjamin,
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Benjamin's treatment of quotation and the collector figure 
is enormously helpful to understanding Eliot's poetic 
method in The Waste Land2.
Benjamin's ideal text of history was a collection or, 
as he called it, a "constellation" of "thought-fragments," 
juxtaposed (quotations from miscellaneous sources that, 
instead of serving to elucidate the author's running 
commentary, would replace it as well as the author, the 
(quotations speaking for themselves through their 
"collision" with each other {(qtd. in Jennings 36). Hannah 
Arendt defines the method as one which consisted of 
"tearing fragments out of their context and arranging them 
afresh in such a way that they illustrated one another and 
were able to prove their raison d'etre in a free-floating 
state" (47). Analogous to the discoveries of modernist 
form, Benjamin discovered the destructive power of the act 
of (quotation, describing its power as arising not from "the 
strength to preserve but to cleanse, to tear out of 
context, to destroy" so as to "break the spell of 
tradition" and to attack the "mindless peace of 
complacency" of the present. Of his own use of the method, 
he stated, "Quotations in my works are like robbers by the
2Svarny has noted the applicability of Benjamin's figure 
of the collector to Eliot's poetic method, but his comparison 
points in a different direction than does my analysis.
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roadside who make an armed attack and relieve an idler of 
his convictions" (gtd. in Arendt 38).
A fusion of Quotations torn from their original 
contexts and then juxtaposed serves to rupture the 
continuum of authoritative discourses, destroying the 
pernicious placidity of the present by disclosing 
dialectical truths undisturbed by the mediations of 
traditional historical narratives, which Benjamin condemned 
as suppressing true relations of past to present. The 
historian becomes, then, as the amateur collector who picks 
or "carves" out of the historical context the precious bit, 
the authentic nugget, exotic and interesting in its 
momentary isolation from living system and its foreignness 
to the present. Destroying its original context, the 
collector creates a new context when he sets it among his 
other artifacts. Although ostensibly preserving the past, 
the collector shatters the work of tradition. Whereas 
tradition orders the past chronologically and 
"systematically in that it separates the positive from the 
negative, the orthodox from the heretical and ...[the] 
obligatory and relevant from the mass of irrelevant or 
merely interesting opinions and data," the collector's view 
of the past, according to Arendt, is unsystematic because 
his criterion is genuineness or significance, "something 
that defies any systematic classification" (44).
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This power of the collector to destroy the causal and 
systematic power of tradition upon the present and to 
present a rival ordering of the past, for Benjamin, was a 
fitting analogy for his work as historian, although the 
imposition of the principle of montage upon history did not 
mean to effect the arbitrariness of surrealism. Only 
through the "constellation of images" gathered from past 
and present, from both the detritus and the treasures of 
culture, could the past speak to the present and in turn 
could the present come to see its own face.
Benjamin's insistence on the destructive power of 
quotation was, according to Arendt, strengthened by the 
War, which confirmed that the past, perceived as a bearer 
of tradition, was no longer "transmissible" but "citable." 
For Benjamin, "the figure of the collector . . . could 
assume such eminently modern features . . . because history 
itself. . . had already relieved him of this task of 
destruction and he only needed to bend down, as it were, to 
select his precious fragments from the pile of debris"
(45). And what history did not "ruin," the collector 
would; Benjamin writes that "he reduces what exists to 
ruins, not in order to create ruins, but in order to find 
the way that leads through them" (qtd. in Frisby 109). Here 
is the same paradox that we find in Eliot's own 
"constellation of images": history's "citability" is both a
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trope for its disintegration and a stratagem of formal 
violence upon its forms.
In The Waste Land, ruination, whether effected by the 
violence of history or by the violence of the poet or 
collector's hand, offers the opportunity to form a fusion 
of the past and the present, of public and private 
contexts, intersecting planes of reference that release 
their meaning through the act of reading. Michael Levenson 
points out that it is important to remember that "the poem 
is not, as is common to say, built upon the juxtaposition 
of fragments: it is built out of their interpenetration" 
(190) . Interpenetration, yes, but not integration: the 
contexts from which the fragments originate cannot be 
erased, thereby always creating tensions that themselves 
generate ever new meanings. If the original contexts are 
literary, they draw the interpreter down through parallel 
configurations; if they are private or unknown, they leave 
a void that gives the fragment a seemingly greater 
significance. The fragments, too, converge with their new 
contexts, forming new meanings as they work with and 
against each other. And yet, as Eliot himself makes clear 
in "Tradition and the Individual Talent," the new context 
cannot help but be altered by the alterior ones. The 
result, as Riquelme points out, is that the "multiple 
linkages" keep the reader in motion not only laterally, as
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parts connect with and echo other parts, but also 
vertically, through stratifications of other texts and 
contexts, since "there are as many paths forward and back 
for the reader to follow, as well as paths to and fro 
between them, and paths in and out of them" (166) .
Of one path, that leads directly from the Stetson 
passage at the end of "The Burial of the Dead" to the last 
lines of "What the Thunder Said," Riquelme has pointed out 
the strategic placement and significance.
Unreal City,
Under the brown fog of a winter dawn,
A crowd flowed over London Bridge, so many,
I had not thought death had undone so many.
Sighs, short and infrequent, were exhaled.
And each man fixed his eyes before his feet. 
Flowed up the hill and down King William Street,
To where Saint Mary Woolnoth kept the hours 
With a dead sound on the final stroke of nine. 
There I saw one I knew, and stopped him, crying 
"Stetson!
"You who were with me in the ships at Mylae!
"That corpse you planted last year in your garden, 
"Has it begun to sprout? Will it bloom this year? 
"Or has the sudden frost disturbed its bed?
"Oh keep the Dog far hence, that's friend to men, 
“Or with his nails he'll dig it up again!
"You! hypocrite lecteur! -- mon semblable, -- mon 
frere!"
I sat upon the shore 
Fishing, with the arid plain behind me 
Shall I at least set my lands in order?
London Bridge is falling down falling down falling 
down
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Poi s'ascose nel foco che gli affina 
Quando fiam ceu chelidon--Q swallow swallow 
I>e Prince d'Aquitaine a la tour abolie 
These fragments X have shored against my ruins 
Why then lie fit you. Hieronymo's mad againe. 
Datta. Dayadhvam. Damyata.
Shantih shantih shantih
In these two passages, the radical discourse of 
quotation, as we have defined it, plays its part 
transparently. Both moments of the poem bring together the 
greatest diversity of style and context, each stanza 
beginning a narrative that disintegrates into a collage of 
quotations, and if there are in the poem, as many readers 
have traced, crises of psychological fragmentation, here 
they become acute. In the Stetson passage, obscure pronouns 
complicate boundaries between speakers and listeners, even 
between readers and speakers, to such a degree that voice, 
Riquelme continues, seems merely a matter of textual 
repetition, and in the last lines, the "I" disintegrates 
into strands of literary quotations, a final collapse of 
voice, which, for many readers, expresses the speaker's 
madness. Moreover, the last lines of the poem itself are 
linked to the Stetson passage by the repetition of "Unreal 
City" in "What the Thunder Said," a link further 
strengthened by other repetitions, enough to say that the 
latter passage cites the former: London resurfaces, as do
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English Renaissance drama (through quotation) and the 
apostrophic "O", all held in a suspension of quotations 
from foreign literatures. More significant to the 
argument, however, is the centrality of the two passages to 
the issue of war and poetry, because being the points at 
which the catabolic and generative properties of 
"citability" are most acute, they plot the intersection of 
the opposing contexts of war and poetry.
The Stetson passage is the first in the poem where 
past and present intersect through textual repetition, 
where modernity is crossed by that which has been, forming 
what Benjamin called the "synchronic moment," i.e., "when 
that which has been and the Mow come together in a flash as 
a constellation" (qtd. in Jennings 36). It is of course 
the speaker's sudden cry to Stetson and his reference to 
Mylae and thus to the Punic Wars that dislocate time and 
space, bringing together post-War London to fourth-century 
post-War Rome, but it is first through Baudelaire and Dante 
that London becomes as a palimpsest, "unreal," a 
description not only of its moral hollowness but also of 
its spectral transparency that allows for the perception of 
its layers.
As the Notes tell us, the opening lines from 
Baudelaire's "Les Septs Vieillards" lie beneath the opening 
words "Unreal City": " Foil rmi 11 ante cit6, cit6 pleine de
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rdves/ Ou le spectre, en plein jour, raccroche le passanti" 
In Baudelaire's poem, the speaker wanders along city 
streets through a yellow fog and is confronted, one by one, 
by seven decrepit men, more apparitions than human who form 
a "cortege infernal." Two passages from Dante's Inferno 
are combined to form the lines "I had not thought death had 
undone so many./Sighs, short and infrequent, were exhaled,/ 
And each man fixed his eyes before his feet." In Canto III 
of Dante's Inferno, entering the Vestibule of Hell where 
the souls of the spiritually torpid are located, Dante sees 
a crowd gathered behind a banner: "e dietro le venia si 
lunga tratta/ di gente, ch'i' non averei creduto/ che morte 
tanta n'avesse disf&tta." [Behind that banner trailed so 
long a file of people, I should never have believed that 
death could have unmade so many souls]. And in Canto IV, 
where the souls of the unbaptized forever wait in Limbo, 
the first circle of Hell, sighs arise from the crowds, 
"Quivi, secondo che per ascoltare,/ non avea pianto mai che 
di sospiri/ che l'aura etterna facevan tremare." [Here, for 
as much as hearing could discover, there was no outcry 
louder than the sighs/ that caused the everlasting air to 
tremble]. In 1950, Eliot remarked that he had used Dante 
here "to establish a relationship between the medieval 
inferno and modern life" (qtd. in Svarny 208).
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The references to Dante and Baudelaire, as well as the 
later reference to Mylae, transform London itself into what 
Kenner has called "a jumbled quotation" ("Urban" 37). 
Post-war London lies over Baudelaire's Paris, over Ancient 
Rome and over Dante's underworld city of suffering like a 
stacked Troy. But perhaps an analogy of layering is 
inappropriate, for the image of a buried past lying 
labyrinthine below the present, connotes a simultaneity and 
a unity of time, that although perfectly appropriate to the 
theme of the passage, distort the passage's structural 
complexity.
Although Jewel Spears Brooker and Joseph Bentley limit 
their view of the Unreal City to the intersection of 
Dante's Dis with 1922 London, they provide two useful 
analogies to explain how the passage presents past and 
present frames: photographic double exposure and the 
oscillation of cursive and recursive images (such as the 
well-known picture of a vase which at a different moment 
can be a picture of two faces in profile facing each 
other). The city is both real and unreal, for as "In a 
photograph, this scene would be a double exposure, two 
cities that have the overlapping and the faceted 
arrangements of cubism . . .  As with the case of the 
concave convex alternation in optical illusions the two 
scenes cannot be perceived simultaneously and their
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oscillation cannot be stopped" (83) . Thus, just as when we 
look at cursive and recursive images, our attention 
oscillates from London of the '20s to the Vestibule of 
Hell, and although we may try to fix the double-image of 
London into a single image, we "will be unable to unify and 
stabilize the doubleness" because "regardless of how 
arduously that mind works to make them coexist in a single 
moment, they will always remain a sequence in time" (83,
85) .
Yet, our inability to integrate perfectly a metaphor 
does not mean that, as 3rooker and Bentley argue, "neither 
city image is established as central" (83). I would argue 
that the contemporary image is ultimately central, albeit 
not necessarily always focused. The very specificity of 
actual street and church names, of London Bridge, and of 
the sound of the nine o'clock bell, harbinger of the daily 
return of London's commuters, does not allow us to stray 
very far from the contemporary, however shot through with 
other "exposures." If, upon a holographic turn, we see 
Dante's spectral city for a moment (once the citation has 
been made clear), or think of Baudelaire's "swarming" 
crowds or even of Roman adventurers, it is always to the 
London street that we return. The convergence and 
divergence of other images or cities is what effects and 
defines the experience of modernity itself, that is, a
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perception, in Eliot's words, "not only of the pastness of 
the past, but of its presence."
Convergence is easy: both in Dante's infernal city and 
in Eliot's doomed London, a crowd--in one case physically 
dead, in another spiritually dead--passes a spectator, 
whether flaneur or pilgrim, who greets one of the crowd in 
a shock of sudden recognition. But this double exposure of 
twentieth-century locale and medieval spectacle is framed 
by direct and indirect quotation of Baudelaire, 
appropriately enough because of Baudelaire's position as 
one of the "moderns" who, like Poe before him in the 
important "The Man of the Crowd," recognized early the 
historical novelty and significance of the modern urban 
crowd.
As a collectivity of mass that moved and changed, the 
crowd offered Baudelaire a paradigm of modernity and, as 
such, an occasion for la modernity. For Baudelaire, the 
artist as flaneur experiences "an immense joy to set up 
house in the heart of the multitude, amid the ebb and flow 
of movement, in the midst of the fugitive and the 
infinite"; the crowd, "an immense reservoir of electrical 
energy" is "a magical society of dreams." The artist in 
the crowd becomes "a mirror as vast as the crowd itself" 
reflecting "the crowd's multiplicity of life and the 
flickering grace of all the elements of life" (9-10) .
In Eliot's hands, however, the "dense and continuous 
tides of population, 1 "the tumultuous sea of human heads" 
(Poe 388-89) that Poe's convalescent-spectator rides, is a 
human river of white-collar workers on their way to 
London's financial district, moving at nine o'clock as 
Eliot (himself "a superior bank clerk") did every morning, 
from Southwark to London Bridge and then onto King William 
Street where the Bank of England and other financial 
institutions stood. Unlike Baudelaire'3 phantasmagoric 
crowd with its "multiplicity of life," this human river is 
starkly monochromatic, homogeneous, and regimented, less 
lively than even Dante's dead souls. It moves as if 
involuntarily; even its utterance, the "sighs, short and 
infrequent," seems more mechanical than expressive. In 
Dante, the sighs of the damned, however horrible, make the 
air tremble with their pathos; here they only punctuate an 
awful silence that has even muffled the sound of the 
Church's bell, whose sound is "dead."
The involuntariness and unpredictability of the modern 
crowd which fascinated Baudelaire are replaced by a 
paralytic repetitiveness, which we can read, given the 
crowd's make-up and destination, as Eliot's comment on the 
dehumanization of the modern urbanite whom he had 
envisioned in an early draft as an insect, part of the 
"swarming life" of London, who "Vibrates unconscious to its
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formal destiny,/Knowing neither how to think, nor how to 
feel/...burrowing in brick and stone and steeli1 In this 
rejected section, the "observing eye," like Baudelaire's 
flaneur, records "the motions of these pavement toys," 
motions which in the Stetson passage are so mechanical that 
one critic has compared the crowd to marching wooden 
soldiers (Schwarz 115).
The figure may be more than whimsical, for Donald 
Childs, in a fairly recent article, has established a 
connection between the name Stetson and the Anzac troops, 
Australian and New Zealand soldiers, who, famous for their 
heroic exploits at Gallipoli in the Dardanelles Campaign 
(the invasion during which Eliot's friend Jean Verdenal 
died), were ubiquitous throughout London, especially after 
1916 when massive numbers of Anzac troops were transferred 
through London from the Near East to France.
Stetson, one of the commuters, has been identified by 
most readers as a twentieth-century Everyman, an ordinary 
clerk, indistinct from the crowd about him, following his 
routine. Call him Jones, Smith or Stetson, no matter. 
Cleanth Brooks, for example, comments that "the name 
'Stetson' I take to have no ulterior significance. It is 
merely an ordinary name such as might be borne by the 
friend one might see in a crowd in a great city" (93). 
Refuting the speculation that Stetson is Ezra Pound,
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Valerie Eliot confirmed Stetson's perfect prosaicness: 
"'Stetson' is not Ezra Pound. Eliot said he was not 
referring to anyone in particular, but simply meant any 
superior bank clerk: a person in a bowler hat, black 
jacket, and striped trousers. To a suggestion he had Pound 
in mind he replied: 'My friend does not dress like that, 
and he would look rather out of place in King William 
Street!'" <qtd. in Childs 131).
Affirming that Pound with his Bohemian dress would be 
an illogical referent for the name "Stetson," Childs 
nevertheless wonders whether it is "not also the case that 
bank clerks in general are not adequate referents for the 
name in question unless, like Stetson, they are found not 
only in King William Street but also on 'ships at Mylae' 
and unless, like Stetson again, they not only dress in a 
certain way and have gardens and dogs, but also have 
gardens with corpses in them--corpses that dogs want to dig 
up" (131). Therefore, Stetson must be more than a bank 
clerk just as the crowd flowing over London Bridge is more 
than the crowd of commuters one would see on any weekday 
morning in 1922.
Robert Crawford's discovery of Stetson's relation to 
the bank clerk Charlie Mears (a character in Rudyard 
Kipling's short story "The Finest Story in the World" who 
remembers past lives as an Egyptian galley slave and a
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Viking seaman) would explain the abrupt transition from the 
modern to the ancient here. Kipling's description of the 
clerk's Quandary certainly lies behind The Waste Land's 
Tiresias: “The plastic mind of the bank-clerk had been 
overlaid, coloured, and distorted by that which he had 
read, and the result as delivered was a confused tangle of 
other voices most like the mutter and hum through a City 
telephone in the busiest part of the day" (gtd. in Crawford 
86-7) .
Still the question remains, why the name “Stetson11? 
Childs, reminding the reader of Eliot's fascination and his 
taking great care with names, maintains that “Stetson,“ a 
peculiar choice of name to represent the ordinary, is a 
metonym for the Anzac soldier. Although in America the 
word "Stetson" was a common synonym for the cowboy hat--the 
ten-gallon hat manufactured and popularized by John 
Batterson Stetson--in Britain it was, as Childs documents, 
commonly associated with the large slouch hat worn by the 
Anzac soldier.
Eliot, like anyone else living in London during the 
war, would have been familiar with the sight of the Stetson 
hat. By 1916, when London was full of these soldiers, they 
had acquired almost celebrity status due to their 
extraordinary heroism at Gallipoli. On April 25, 1916, to 
celbrate the Anzac contribution before the troops left for
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Australia and New Zealand, a much larger parade was held, 
one made up of 5,000 Anzac troops. Childs reminds us that 
this parade through London's financial district included as 
part of its route both The Waste Land's King William Street 
and Cornhill Street, where at 17 Cornhill stood the offices 
of the Colonial and Foreign Department of Lloyd's Bank, one 
of which belonged to Eliot: "Given the parade route, and 
given the disruption to the business in the area caused by 
it, there is every chance that Eliot knew of it or watched 
it himsel£--recalling Gallipoli and Verdenal, and 
associating them thereafter with the famous Australian 
slouch hat" (145).
The metonymic "Stetson" and the reference to a 
military campaign by a fellow comrade-in-arms justify 
developing a third exposure of military troops marching 
over the bridge and into the heart of London. The phrase 
"death had undone so many" becomes literal, especially when 
we consider the disaster that was the Dardanelles Campaign, 
during which, on May 2, 1915, Eliot's friend Jean Verdenal 
would die, in Eliot's words, "to be mixed with the mud of 
Gallipoli" (Criterion 452). The two grand parades in 
London that marked the opening and closing of the campaign 
could not disguise the waste of human life: of the 400,000 
British troops engaged, 200,000 were casualties; the French 
suffered an even greater percentage of casualties, losing
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more than half of their 79,000 soldiers. After eight 
months, the Allies were forced to retreat, having gained 
nothing.
It should be noted, however, that although the speaker 
may call out to an Anzac soldier, he speaks not of a modern 
but of an ancient war. Instead of to Gallipoli, we move to 
the Battle of Mylae, which ended the First Punic War in 260 
B.C. But, as many critics have noted, the incongruity is 
logical. The First World War was regarded as essentially 
the final military expression of a protracted economic 
battle between two commercial and political empires. So 
too were the Punic Wars, fought by two trade rivals for 
supremacy of the Mediterranean. In addition, both wars 
ended in settlements that defined peace as the interval 
between wars. Frustrated by Carthage's endurance, Rome 
ended any possibility of its enemy's restoration by 
destroying the city of Carthage, massacring its people, 
salting the land in and around the city, and in a final 
forbiddance of any human habitation, dedicating the site of 
the razed city to the infernal gods--thus coining the 
phrase "a Carthagenian Peace," a peace established by the 
utter destruction of one's enemy.
The phrase would appear again in 1919 during the 
drafting of the Treaty of Versailles, when, as Eleanor Cook 
reminds us, “the argument for declaring the third war
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against Carthage (repeated again and again by Cato the 
Censor, with his famous refrain Carthago delenda eat) was 
the argument at the center of the controversy over the 
peace treaties: whether the reviving prosperity of a 
defeated trade rival could become a danger to the victor." 
The Treaty's extreme, punitive terms triggered a raging 
criticism, none so impassioned as that of John Maynard 
Keynes, who in his resignation as representative and in his 
subsequent best-selling book The Economic Consequences of 
Peace (1919) would attack the Treaty as a "Carthagenian 
Peace." Keynes warned of one sinister consequence of such 
a peace, that the treaty's harsh conditions would 
eventually not only oppress the defeated but also the 
victors themselves. He warned that the Allies invited 
"their own destruction also, being so deeply and 
inextricably intertwined with their victims by hidden 
psychic and economic bonds. . . . If we aim deliberately at 
the impoverishment of Central Europe, . . . nothing can 
then delay for very long that final civil war . . . which 
will destroy, whoever is victor, the civilization and 
progress of our generation" (qtd. in Cook 350-351). In his 
work supervising the repayment of German pre-war debts for 
Lloyd's, Eliot himself was quite familiar with what he 
called the "knotty points" of the Peace Treaty, that 
"appalling document" (Letters 368). Keynes's argument, with
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which Eliot, according to both Cook and Christopher Ricks, 
was familiar, paralleled Eliot's and other contemporaries' 
diagnosis of impending cultural doom. Cook, who traces the 
influence of Keynes on The Waste Land, observes, "in a poem 
of 1922, to introduce the battle of l&ylae where the reader 
expects a reference to a World War I battle is to raise 
chilling questions" (350).
To make parallels between Rome and London was 
certainly a national habit, but as Cook points out, only 
rarely at the turn of the century "did they serve to set a 
guestion mark againsc the enterprise of empire itself"
(350) . In The Waste Land, they do: the transfigurations of 
a bank clerk into an Anzac soldier, Roman seaman, and 
underworld inhabitant trace the relations of empire, war, 
and death. Although one might be tempted, like Cleanth 
Brooks, to draw from these relations the conclusion that 
"all wars are one war; all experience one experience" (93) 
or John T. Mayer's variation, "all wars are one war, all 
cities one city, all times one time for those bound upon 
the wheel" (271), we must be careful that, after 
recognizing the historical parallel between Rome and 
London, we do not then just universalize the relationship 
and thereby erase the specific historical context, what 
Svarny has described as "the spectral atmosphere of post­
war london, in which the guilt, shock, and primarily
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incomprehension of a traumatized society is manifested and 
translated through a sequence of historical, cultural, and 
psychic dislocations" (163).
To universalize the relationship would also erase the 
feeling of radical dislocation begun by the speaker's cry 
to Stetson, a cry that will ramble from Roman and 
Carthagenian ships to buried corpses, about to sprout and 
bloom, to gardens disturbed, to sinister digging dogs, and 
to hypocrite readers. To minimalize this dislocation, to 
normalize the text, we can, if we wish, and as some have, 
turn Stetson the bank clerk into a horticulturist with a 
taste for murder and literature or as several critics do, 
even construct a personal history and a belief system for 
him, so we can then read the entire passage opened and 
closed by quotation marks as the utterance of one speaker, 
the poet, albeit a bit hysterical or lunatic. But this 
would be to gloss over the passage's strangeness, a 
strangeness compounded by the instability of voice, despite 
the presence of direct quotation marks. is this a 
dialogue, as Kenner has assumed? If not, if it is the 
speech of only one character (as most readers affirm), who 
is this "I" of the Unreal City section? Certainly not 
Madame Sosostris, the referent of the previous "I". If it 
is the voice, who reports her divinations, is it replaced 
in the "Unreal City" passage by another voice, another
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"observing eye," another voice on Charlie Mears' crossed 
phone-line connections? Is the first "you" addressed to 
Stetson the same "you" of the corpse or the "You!" of 
which Baudelaire's reader is an appositive? Stetson 
himself is a presence more figurative than real, whose 
"chief characteristic," according to Denis Donoghue, "is 
that he does not answer, though he instigates, the 
questions addressed to him. Stetson is the name of the 
interrogation . . . he is an oracle who stirs a nervous 
quiver of interrogation, and dies out in a line from 
Baudelaire" (188-89). If the interrogation itself "dies 
out" in the last line, then the interrogator's voice seems 
extinguished by the heavy allusiveness of its own speech.
What begins as quoted speech of one speaker to an 
identified listener reverts into the discourse of 
quotation, so moving from language as speech to language as 
text, constructed from the echoes and actual shards of past 
texts. The corpse in the garden stirs memories of other 
corpses, such as the corpse under Blake's "A Poison Tree" 
and Dignam's corpse in Ulysses, regarding which Leopold 
Bloom says, "Plant him and have done with him" (231). 
Planted in an English garden, not unlike a lilac or 
hyacinth bulb, Eliot's corpse resembles the victim of a 
British murderer who, according to Kenner, "unlike his 
American counterpart, who in a vast land instinctively puts
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distance between himself and the corpse prefers to keep it 
near at hand; in the garden, or behind the wainscotting" 
(162). In a poem whose original title came from a Dickens' 
novel about body-robbing and murder along the Thames and 
which opens from the perspective of the buried dead, this 
corpse is one of many that surface, evidence to Kenner and 
Gregory Jay that the poem hides a story of murder, of the 
type popularized by the "low crime" press, a type of which 
Eliot was exceedingly fond.
This potentially sprouting and blooming corpse is 
also the dead god Osiris, whose annual consolidation and 
rebirth bring life to the dead land, and is The Golden 
Bough's ritual figure of the fertility cult, the corn-
effigy which buried in the fall is dug up in the spring to
check its sprouting. The abrupt, hurried rhythm of the 
three questions --"Has it begun to sprout? Will it bloom 
this year?/"Or has the sudden frost disturbed its bed?"-- 
suggests more than idle curiosity as regards the health of 
an acquaintance's garden. They suggest anxiety about the 
expected "blooming" of the corpse in a place where rebirth
means not regeneration but the revivification of private
and cultural memories that, having lost their restorative 
power, return to disturb the mind, just as the dead return 
from their beds to haunt the living. And to return means.
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given the implied concealment of a crime, to discover some 
awful truth, some secret guilt shared by accomplices.
What do, in fact, "sprout" are words--not from a human 
corpse, but a dead author's literary corpus. The next two 
lines, "Oh keep the Dog far hence, that's friend to men,/
Or with his nails he'll dig it up again!," as the Notes 
tell us, indirectly quote lines from John Webster's The 
White Devil ("But keep the wolf far hence, that's foe to 
man/For with his nails he'll dig them up again.11) Changing 
Webster's wolf to a dog allows Eliot to play with the 
possibilities of the dog as symbol. Eliot's capitalization 
of Dog alludes, as many have noted, to Sirius, the Dog 
Star, which, although a friend to navigators, symbolized 
the coming of war, sterility and death. In the Aeneid, 
Sirius lays waste to the lands around Troy, bringing 
drought and pestilence. To the ancients, the dog was a 
scavenger, a symbol of feral energies, corruption, and 
death yet later would acquire a more genial reputation as 
"man's best friend," a symbol of loving fidelity and 
domesticity. Like the dog in Joyce's Ulysses, who with his 
"rag of wolf's tongue redpanting from his jaws" looks "for 
something lost in a past life,1 "vulturing the dead, " 
Eliot's dog disturbs the corpse, uncovering that which it 
is hoped will remain buried and secret, whether a past
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murder or a past murderous to the tranquility of 
forgetfulness.
Like Webster's other wolf, who, in The Duchess of 
Malfi, seeks to scrape up the corpse, "Not to devour the 
corpse, but to discover/The horrid murder," the reader 
digs, encouraged by indirect citation and by the 
intricacies of allusion, but before he or she can scrape 
along too deeply, seeking the corpse in the corpus, the 
line "You! hypocrite lecteur! -- mon 3embable, -- mon 
frere!" discovers him within the text, shattering the 
conventional boundaries between readers and texts, thus 
shattering the illusion that the passage is spoken rather 
than written. The quotation marks now indicate both the 
continued direct quotation of a speech and the direct 
quotation from another text, complicating, in Riquelme's 
words, "the problem of determining . . . what is and is not
quoted and what is and is not speech."
Altered by the English "You!” which connects it to 
the two you's of the previous lines, Baudelaire's line, 
like the "blooming" corpse (and like the fleurs du mal 
which grow from corruption), revives as something other 
than what it was, torn from its original context, altered 
by its new location like the literary swag of Eliot's "good 
poet" who steals to weld "his theft into a whole of feeling 
which is unique, utterly different from that from which it
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was torn." In Its present constitution, Eliot's Baudelaire 
line does bring with, it thematic connections, feeding the 
present with the past, acting as what Eliot in "Tradition 
and the Individual Talent" called the "present moment of 
the past," when that which is “already living" separates 
itself from "what is dead." Yet, despite its formal 
integration into the "Unreal City" passage, the line 
retains all the strangeness of the isolated fragment, 
foreign in its words, alien in its presence: it acts 
simultaneously as "the present moment of the past" and as 
the ruin of the past in the present.
Not only does the intrusion of the Baudelaire 
quotation formally implicate the reader in textual 
processes, it also implicates him morally by means of the 
line's thematic import. In Baudelaire's poem "Au Lecteur," 
the line (appearing of course with a "vous" rather than an 
"I") indicts its reader who to escape from boredom takes a 
voluptuary's pleasure in fantasies of violence while safely 
sheltered from its reality (C'est 1 'EnnuiI--1'oeil charge 
d'un pleur involontaire,/II reve d'echafauds en fumant son 
houka.") And in Eliot's poem, the Baudelaire address 
implicates the reader, now brother and double of the 
writer, in a writing that seems to be able only to occur 
through a formal and contextual violence. Like the 
unpleasant but entrancing intimacy of the "you" which Poe's
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criminals force upon their readers, the intimacy between 
writer and reader is one which breaks down their mutual 
cultivation of a detached spectatorship. Murder, secret 
crime, war, live burial--the reader is implicated in a 
polysemous evil that he mistakenly assumes is safely shut 
up within the fictive and literal boundaries of the text.
The reader faces his double, his brother in hypocrisy 
by means of the "You!" and the "mon," two pronouns which 
echo the opening address, "You who were with me [italics 
mine] in the ships at Mylaei," it too an exclamation 
bristling with the shock of recognition and the claim of 
alliance. The three you's link Stetson, their original 
antecedent, to the reader and Stetson's interlocutor to the 
writer. Although, as we have seen, Stetson cannot, as sole 
referent, ultimately shepherd the loose aggregate of 
pronouns, this silent metonym of war does generate a 
succession of doubles: brothers-in-arms, war dead and 
living dead, murderer and accomplice, reader and writer-- 
counterparts arising from a configuration of repeated 
pasts, both literary and historical, which, resisting 
assimilation into narrative, expose connections between 
language and war. Just as Baudelaire's poems grow out of 
evil, just as the corpse fertilizes next spring's bloom, 
Eliot's words grow out of the remains of other texts, 
tracing patterns of mortality both cultural and personal.
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The phrase "Unreal City" will reappear again in "The
Fire Sermon" to introduce another London scene, set at noon
o£ a winter's day, during which Tiresias, another
underworld inhabitant, makes his way through the city. And
in "What the Thunder Said," the city will reappear again,
although now exploding in an apocalyptic vision o£ war that
joins the destruction o£ ancient and modern empires to the
Slaughter of the Innocents and the post-war civil conflict
of Eastern Europe. Only "Unreal" is cited, the word "City"
itself absent, formally swallowed by the passage:
What is that sound high in the air
Murmur of maternal lamentation
Who are those hooded hordes swarming
Over endless plains, stumbling in cracked earth
Ringed by the flat horizon only
What is the city over the mountains
Cracks and reforms and bursts in the violet air
Falling towers
Jerusalem Athens Alexandria
Vienna London
Unreal
London's "Falling towers," once the White Towers of 
"The Fire Sermon" now become London Bridge, "falling down 
falling down falling down," which once carried the protean 
crowd of commuters, soldiers, and ghosts. We know from 
Ronald Bush that this nightmare of London's destruction-- 
specifically its falling bridges and its hallucinatory 
quality--owes much to a real nightmare purportedly dreamt 
by Bertrand Russell, who related it to Eliot during the 
period that Eliot was working on The Waste Land: "After
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seeing troop trains departing from Waterloo, X used to have 
strange visions of London as a place of unreality. X used 
in imagination to see the bridges collapse and sink, and 
the whole great city vanish like a morning mist. Xts 
inhabitants began to seem like hallucinations, and X would 
wonder whether the world in which X thought X had lived was 
a mere product of my own febrile nightmares . . . .  X spoke 
of this to T . S. Eliot, who put it into The Waste Land1 
(qtd. in Bush 249). In Eliot's lines the gothic rhetoric of 
nightmare collapses into the childish sing-song of nursery 
rhyme, gravity collapsing into a giddiness that speaks less 
of flippancy than of the coming disintegration of poetic 
voice into a series of quotations, now momentarily 
unburdened by the appropriating, or as Eliot would have it, 
the "amalgamating" voice of modernity.
Fragments from Dante, the Pervigilium Veneris,
Tennyson, Nerval, Kyd, and the Ppanishads lie next to each 
other, fragments with which the poet sets his lands in 
order, ruins he has shored against his own ruin. How these 
quotations relate to the poem's themes has been extensively 
studied, but what has not been noticed is that buried 
within the ruins of these quotations, specifically in the 
quotation from the Pervigilium Veneris, lies the ruin of 
another city destroyed, its destruction linked to a failure 
of language. Xf we complete Eliot's allusion to the
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Pervigilium Veneris, we will find, at the end of that 
anonymous Latin poem, reference to a city destroyed by 
silence:
quando fiam uti chelidon ut tacere desinam? 
perdidi musam tacendo, nec me Apollo respicit: 
sic Amyclas, cum tacerent, perdidit silentium.
[when shall I be as the swallow, that I may cease 
to be voiceless? X have lost the Muse in silence, 
nor does Apollo regard me: so Amyclae, being mute, 
perished by silence.]
Most commentators believe that the legend of Amyclae, 
a city destroyed by silence, referred to the city by that 
name a few miles from Sparta which was famous for its 
sanctuary dedicated to Apollo and Hyacinth (considering the 
importance of the Hyacinth myth to The Waste Land, it might 
be appropriate to mention that Hyacinth, according to 
legend, was the son of King Amyclas, ruler of Amyclae.) 
Reportedly surviving intermittent siege by the Dorians for 
over a hundred years, Amyclae was finally captured and 
completely destroyed because, according to Servius, the 
late Latin Virgilian commentator, its citizens, "broken by 
terror" and rumor, were prohibited by a "broad law" even to 
speak of possible attack. Consequently, when the Dorians 
came, the city perished because of its silence, hence the 
proverb of "taciturnus Amyclae" or "silentia Amyclae" 
(Clementi 263-69).
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Like Amyclae, invisible and silent, the poet of The 
Waste Land is figuratively disfigured, invisible in his art 
and voiceless because of language's failure to be anything 
but repetitive and belated. Voicelessness and the 
agonistic force of silence produce the proliferation of 
other voices, other languages, noises and other signs of 
the inarticulate which, paradoxically, give to the poet his 
song, a song that arises out of the violations of history. 
Thus, the Latin poet can "cease to be voiceless" through 
transfiguring his voice into that of the swallow, Procne, 
who names the criminal or that of the nightingale,
Philomela, who sings in "inviolable voice" of her 
violation. And Hieronymo can reveal the murder of his son 
through the cryptic collection of his play's "unknown and 
sundry languages."
The formal violence of collection, of citation, 
reveals a poetic stratagem of double intent--on the one 
hand, to transform the violations of history through a 
language already disfigured and insufficient; and, on the 
other hand, to be an epitaph for poetry. For if poetry can 
be written in The Waste Land only through the linguistic 
disfigurement and the personal effacement that citation 
provides, then the very method of citation may be seen as a 
trope for the end of a poetry that can find its voice only 
in the languages of the inarticulate and in verbal
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repetition. Itself scarred by violence and violation, the 
poem through its stratagem to transform the violations of 
history into song, deconstructs itself, every form of 
verbal repetition, every "withered stump of time," only 
repeating the conditions of violation and repression, able 
only to gesture to a silence whose fluencies adumbrate the 
absent voice of God.
CHAPTER FOUR 
FOUR QUARTETS; ELIOT'S DEAD PATROL
On August 9, 1930, Eliot, in a letter to William Force 
Stead, speculated that "between the usual subjects of 
poetry and 'devotional' verse, there is a very important 
field still very unexplored by modern poets--the experience 
of man in search of God, and trying to explain to himself 
his intenser human feelings in terms of the divine goal" 
(qtd. in Gardner 29). Five years later, just before the 
Second World War, Eliot would begin writing of such a 
journey in "Burnt Norton," a journey that would end in 
"Little Gidding," completed during the darkest period of 
the war. The idea of a sequence of four poems, each 
articulating a different perspective on temporal loss and 
the search for origin, and each interacting with the other 
like the patterning of themes in a musical quartet, came to 
Eliot only after the completion and publication of "Burnt 
Norton,1 when the economic and public hazards of war forced 
the closing of theaters in London, compelling Eliot to turn 
away from his playwriting and back to poetry. The war, 
according to Eliot, "destroyed that impulse for a time, the
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conditions of one's life changed, and one was thrown in on 
oneself" (qtd. in Sinclair 110).
Although Eliot had already abandoned the radically 
hermetic styles of The Waste Land and Ash Wednesday for a 
more discursive poetry of 'statement,' a poetry more 
suitable to the practical demands of the stage, as well as 
to his increasing emphasis on what he called "the social 
function of poetry," the war encouraged the extension of 
the personal themes of "Burnt Norton" into the public and 
broadly religious and patriotic themes of the next three 
quartets. Although their thematic and formal multiplicity 
overwhelms the normally one-dimensional category of war 
poetry, the last three quartets can be read as war poems—  
Eliot himself, after all, said that they were "in a sense 
war poems"--their temper conditioned by their inception and 
completion during the war.1 And, in a first draft of his 
lecture "The Three Voices of Poetry," he described the last 
three quartets as being "primarily patriotic poems" (qtd. 
in Ackroyd 264), only to delete the phrase on revision, a 
deletion understandable in a period of history which had 
painfully revealed the thin line between patriotism and the 
atrocities of political and religious ideologies. Yet to 
its first audience (with the exception of the colder eyes
1 In the 1958 lecture "T. S. Eliot Talks About his 
Poetry."
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of readers like those of the acutely disappointed George 
Orwell who whinqpered about the poems' "gloomy mumblings"), 
the poems were generally accepted as patriotic poems, their 
themes and symbols closely reacting to specific political 
and social needs.
"East Coker"'s historical theme, for example, its 
address of the antiquity and endurance of English history 
and tradition, is timely, given the poem's being written 
and published during the confused and frightening time of 
the "Phoney War" when an invasion of England seemed 
immanent. Eliot's use of figures of war in the fifth 
section of "East Coker" to express the poet's struggle with 
words, the
. . . raid on the inarticulate 
With shabby equipment always deteriorating 
In the general mess of imprecision of feeling. 
Undisciplined squads of emotion 
was, as Angus Calder states, certainly topical in 1940 when 
the average British citizen, waiting for war to begin in 
earnest, would have been called to repress his emotions 
through discipline: "Having 'shabby equipment' (the Home
Guard at first in some places drilled with broomsticks) was 
no excuse for not 'trying.' The citizen's job was to try, 
and not to reason why--'The rest is not our business.' 
Sub-textually this section can be read as a Conservative
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utterance . . . in favour of unquestioning natural unity in 
a common struggle to 'recover what has been lost'" (ISO- 
51) .
The American themes of "Dry Salvages"--Eliot's return 
to his American memories and his tribute to the heritage of 
the American explorer and sailor, in the context of the 
stoic call to "Fare forward"--may have expressed for 
British and American readers their shared heritage and 
Eliot's support of Britain's vigorous campaign to convince 
the U.S. to come into the war. And the allusion in the 
third section to Krishna's exhortation to Arjuna to fight 
even against his kin, secure in the equipoise of 
detachment, can be read as part of the poem's exhortation 
to disinterested, self-sacrificing action in the face of 
increasing and necessary violence. The poem's maritime 
themes and its prayer for the souls of dead seamen came at 
the height of the "Battle of the Atlantic," in which U- 
boats sank hundreds of British and neutral merchant ships 
carrying much needed supplies to Britain. The fourth 
section's prayer "on behalf of/ Women who have seen their 
sons or husbands/ Setting forth, and not returning," would 
have had more than a general significance.
And in "Little Gidding," the first draft of which was 
written during the worst bombing of London (3,000 killed on 
one night), Eliot integrated his experiences as an air raid
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warden with a Dantesque purgatorial vision, evoking the 
common experience of the terrifying Blitz and offering a 
visionary context larger than the present terrifying one, a 
context which offered in the calm reassurance of "And all 
3hall be well and/ All manner of thing shall be well" the 
faith in what Kathleen Raine, in praise of Eliot's 
achievement, then called "the language of humanity" at a 
time when victory seemed doubtful.
To their first audience, the poems were received with 
an intensity of gratitude and reverence difficult, maybe 
impossible, to recreate outside of their specific wartime 
context. Lynda11 Gordon has astutely recognized that the 
consolations of the last lines, in which human suffering 
and divine love are reconciled through the mystical symbol 
of the rose, "remains a mere formula unless it touches the 
life of the reader." we have only to contrast the pique of 
Graham Martin and Bernard Bergonzi's comments on the 
Quartets (Cf. 18) with the comments of its first readers. 
Lyndall Gordon refers to the wartime reminiscences of Mary 
Lee Settle, an American novelist living in London during 
the war. Settle "recalled the impact of Four Quartets when 
there really was 'dust in the air' and the ruined rows of 
houses stood like empty husks, their wall paper stained 
with rain. At a time when people queued for rations and 
suffered loss and privation, Eliot 'had somehow refined
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what he had to tell us, beyond the banality of 
disappointment and hopelessness, into a promise like 
steel.' That first generation of readers responded to a 
promise of recovery made with a 'miraculous effrontery of 
spirit' in the face of years of wrong" (144). Noel Annan, 
in his recent memoir of British intellectual life during 
the war, remembered how "As each Quartet appeared during 
the war in its paper cover, you were humbled. Eliot's 
modesty and gentleness reminded you of other worlds of sin, 
repentance and death whether or not you were a Christian.
He did not call you to righteousness as the left-wing poets 
of the thirties did. He asked you to live a little less 
trivial a life" (62).
Yet it was the charge of triviality that worried Eliot 
as he wrote the poems. To his friend Nary Hutchinson,
Eliot worried that if the poems were badly written, their 
triviality and superfluousness would be emphasized (Ackroyd 
263). And in a 1942 letter to Martin Browne, Eliot 
expressed what was a common worry among writers of the 
time, the sense of uselessness, and, more important, the
sense of impropriety at working on verse in the midst of
conflagration: "It is one thing to see what was best worth
one's while doing, in a distant retrospect: but in the
midst of what is going on now, it is hard, when you sit 
down at a desk, to feel confident that morning after
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morning spent fiddling with words and rhythms is a 
justified activity -- especially as there is never any 
certainty that the whole thing won't have to be scrapped. 
And on the other hand, external or public activity is more 
of a drug than is this solitary toil which often seems so 
pointless" (qtd. in Gardner 21).
Eliot's misgivings concerning his "fiddling with words 
and rhythms"--a phrase which echoes Henry James's concern 
at "putting into play mere fiddlesticks"--his fear of being 
charged with triviality, may have arisen from the enormous 
difficulty of what Eliot was attempting to do and not to 
do. He was not attempting to write a "war poetry," in the 
standard sense but only, as he said, "in a sense,-" indeed, 
the Four Quartets do not fit either of his two categories 
of war poetry as defined in the 1942 "Poetry in Wartime" 
essay, written in the same month "Little Gidding" was first 
published. Despite the nature of their first reception and 
the strong patriotic tone of certain passages, the poems 
are far too private and far too thematically and formally 
complex to be classified as a poetry that "expresses and 
stimulates pride in the military virtues of a people;1 and 
they certainly are not the "private poetry" of the soldier- 
poet. But in the 1942 essay, the point from which this 
discussion began, Eliot implies another possible avenue for 
a poet writing in wartime, another avenue over and above
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the essay's general exhortation to poets to "preserve and 
enrich" the heritage o£ their language.
As we have discussed, Eliot states that to write of 
war with the kind of understanding necessary to the writing 
of poetry, the experience of war had to "become part of a 
man's whole past," to be integrated with other parts of 
experience, distanced from the exigencies and distracting 
attachments of the present moment, and it, according to 
Eliot, would probably "bear fruit in something very 
different from what, during time of war, people call 'war 
poetry.'" The contemporaneous, the present moment, must 
fall back into a larger "life," for, as The Waste Land 
enacts with the "discourse of quotation" and the Four 
Quartets reveals through the technique of psychological 
retrospection, the present experience cannot speak to us 
until it is part of the past, where although dead in a 
sense, it yet lives in its potential to be transfigured by 
the creative act of re-membrance, and in turn, to transform 
the present. As the moment remembered can never be the 
experienced moment itself, so the experience transformed in 
the poetry will "bear fruit in something very different."
Yet from 1940 to 1942 Eliot did (in some sense) write 
of his and others' experience of war while he was in the 
midst of it, not years after the experience had become part 
of his past. And that experience of war was only one part
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of a whole spectrum of past and present experience quoted,
re-collected, and transformed into the Four Quartets. To
become "part of a man's whole past," then, also meant to
become part of a past figured into a "poetry," not the
isolated poem that might be generated out of the shock of
war, but the "poetry," which, in his "Note on War Poetry,"
as we have discussed earlier, Eliot described as a "life"
set in opposition to the situation of war:
It seems just possible that a poem might happen 
To a very young man: but a poem is not poetry-- 
That is a life.
War is not a life: it is a situation,
One which may neither be ignored nor accepted,
A problem to be met with ambush and stratagem, 
Enveloped and scattered.
The "life" as a poetry, the "poetry" as a life; the 
war figured into the life, itself figured into the poetry. 
But first, to the life figured as a poetry.
In the Four Quartets, the autobiographical impulse 
draws the poetic self's encounters with the contradictions 
of existence in time, with those enigmas of temporality and 
mortality, into the ambush of form, which seeks to re-enact 
and, as James Olney has demonstrated, "to refigure past 
experience as present consciousness" (265), and thereby to 
find a vital pattern ("a poetry") in the life, a whole of 
feeling that parallels and participates in a larger 
transcendent pattern of eternity, "the still point of the
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turning- world . . . /Where past and future are gathered." 
But the search for this pattern involves the sad knowledge 
of language's ultimate limitations in charting the elusive 
and fugitive feelings of the "unhounded," of the center 
(whether of absence or presence is at this point 
irrelevant), of that which resists the full reach of 
language.
In his lecture "Poetry and Drama,“ Eliot granted a 
higher privilege to music, which he thought came closest, 
of all the forms of art, to reaching the "indefinite extent 
of feeling," the "border" of which "only music can 
express." Although poetry moves in the same direction as 
music, seeking essentially "an unattainable ideal," "we can 
never emulate music, because to arrive at the condition of 
music would be the annihilation of poetry" (93).
The Four Quartets, as even its title implies, 
encourages, however, comparison of its form to musical 
structures; we know that Eliot was initially inspired by 
Beethoven's late quartets and that the structure of the 
quartet suggested to him "the notion of making a poem by 
weaving in together three or four superficially unrelated 
themes: the 'poem' being the degree of success in making a 
new whole out of them" (Letter to John Hayward qtd. in 
Gardner 26). In "The Music of Poetry," a lecture given in 
the same year as the publication of the Four Quartets,
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Eliot said that the poet and the musician shared the same 
concern with "the sense of rhythm and the sense of 
structure," and speculated that because the "use of 
recurrent themes is as natural to poetry as to music," 
there "are possibilities for verse which bear some analogy 
to the development of a theme by different groups of 
instruments; there are possibilities of transitions in a 
poem comparable to the different movements of a symphony or 
a quartet; there are possibilities of contrapuntal 
arrangement of subject-matter" (32).
Some readers, such as Gabriel Pearson, for example, 
have found the musical analogy of the Four Quartets 
suspect:
This analogy is infinitely fertile, infinitely 
seductive. It dissolves the most resistent 
linearities of the discursive mode, bending them back 
upon themselves, making them answerable to the logic 
of metaphor and myth. In the timeless image, the tough 
contradictions of history are reconciled. It is a 
musical Hegelianism, the antinomies of experience 
resolved and transcended in the higher term, which is 
the very form of their expression" ("King Log" 34).
And the British poet Geoffrey Hill, more directly hostile
to Eliot's method in the Four Quartets, attacks "the
expansive, outward gesture towards the condition of music"
as a "helpless gesture of surrender, oddly analogous to
that stylish aesthetic of despair, that desire of the
ultimate integrity of silence, to which so much eloquence
has been so frequently and indefatigably devoted" (9).
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Although both Pearson's and Kill's judgments accurately 
diagnose strong tendencies in Eliot's poetry and 
characteristics of his poetic temper--the attraction to the 
serene purity of silence, the obsession with transcendence 
of dichotomies into the reconciliation of formal wholes-- 
they seem to assume that the choice of the musical analogy 
in the Four Quartets wholly rests on the conventional 
notion of music as an immaterial art, a "spiritual" 
phenomenon, linked in its immateriality to the 
transcendent, to the "timeless image," as well as assuming 
that Eliot's use of a "musical form" is an attempt to erase 
dichotomies through the transcendence into form.
On the contrary, Eliot's alliance of poetry and music 
rests, in addition to their dependence on material, on 
their mutual dependence on temporality, on their both being 
"arts of time." Thus in "Burnt Norton," Eliot writes,
Words move, music moves
Only in time; but that which is only living
Can only die. Words, after speech, reach
Into the silence. Only by the form, the pattern.
Can words or music reach
The stillness, as a Chinese jar still
Moves perpetually in its stillness.
Only really living in the time of their actual execution,
both words and music begin and end as the coming into being
and the falling into death of sound. Etienne Gilson,
labeling music "the art of that which is to die," describes
139
it as an art which, aspires to its own death because "its 
parts must fall back into nothingness one by one so that 
the whole, of which they are elements, can come into 
being." And like music, poetry is made up of sounds which 
also move through time (whether read or heard involves the 
sometimes complicating difference between external and 
internal soundings): "If the genuine poem is made of words
actually heard, no poem ever exists in its material 
totality; only one line of poetry at a time can exist and 
of this line only one word, and of this word only one 
syllable or vocal emission" (217).
Unable to embody the simultaneity of form of the 
plastic arts, such as that of a Chinese jar, words and 
music can only achieve their wholeness, the "form, the 
pattern," outside of their own materiality, beyond the 
"stillness of the violin," through the intervening 
intelligence of memory which structures sound into living 
significations, into wholes of rhythm and meaning. Without 
the intervention of memory, as Gilson (echoing Augustine) 
notes, the elements of musical and poetic sound "would fall 
back into the void of silence as they fade if memory did 
not forget this unity by endowing these elements with at 
least a temporary subsistence and a mode of 
intellectuality" (146).
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The Four Quartets encourages analogies between music,
poetry, and autobiography because of their shared relations
to mortality and time. Music's temporality, its paradoxical
dependence on its own demise for its very existence,
parallels poetry's exploitation of the reciprocal movement
of creation and loss that is the movement of the word in
time. And as music's and poetry's achievement of form is
inseparable from a resignation to their own insufficiency,
autobiographical art begins with and is impossible without
the coming into being and the falling into death of
experience, which is the life of consciousness in time. As
each musical note must fall back into the silence so that
the whole may be composed by memory, so the present
experience, if it is to have any meaning, must "die" and
become part of the past where it can be refigured and
redeemed by the creative act of memory into present
consciousness, because immediate experience cannot be
intelligible until it ceases to be lived:
We had the experience but missed the meaning,
And approach to the meaning restores the
experience
In a different form.
The form must always be different because memory is not a
bond servant to the past, its compositions never faithful
reproductions, never, as Olney states, the "orderly
summoning up of something dead--a sort of Final Judgment on
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past events." Xn short, memory does not begin "in the far- 
distant past . . . that then follows a course to the 
present" (264).
However much an "art of time,“ like music and poetry, 
autobiography also can be, because of its impulse to 
origin, an art of modernity, its repossession of the past 
motivated by its compulsion to bring the significance and 
the completion of form to the fragile presentness of 
consciousness. George Steiner, discussing the relation of 
poesis to self-portraiture, states that "self-portraiture 
is the most adversarial mode of creation," because it 
expresses the artist's "compulsion to freedom,. . . his 
agonistic attempt to repossess, to achieve mastery over the 
forms and meanings of his own being" in the face of "the 
servitude of his unwilled, unchosen coming into the world, 
and in the face of the absurd, unnaming logic of death"
(Presences 205, 206). Thus in the self-portraits of 
Rembrandt, the contrast of emergent form and surrounding 
darkness expresses the coming into being of a self, or more 
accurately, of a persona, out of a dark nothingness which 
precedes and frames it, the darkness of death held at bay 
by the formal seizure of the painter's face in time.
To create a portrait of the present self through the 
movement of language, however, necessitates the return to 
and the integration of what Olney describes as "all the
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old, half-remembered, or perhaps misremembered selves, 
which were adequate to their own proper moments, into the 
pattern of the new self, which is born in the moment now 
out of this very exercise of consciousness and memory" 
(264-65) . In the Four Quartets, the creation of such a 
pattern involves the problematic discrepancy between form 
and experience and the resultant provisionality of present 
consciousness. The "now" of our consciousness ordinarily 
exists only as two simultaneous movements in time: first, 
the falling back into the past and the subsequent 
modification of "all we have been," which is memory, and 
second, the springing forward into the future, which is 
perception. Thus, the present, never self-originating, 
exists as a collapse into the past or, to borrow Bergson's 
image, a treading upon the future (180)2. The return to 
and the integration of the past into the present, which 
makes identity and self-consciousness possible, therefore, 
must be a continual process of transformation.
But in the Four Quartets, the presence of 
consciousness is not synonymous with the present of
2 My argument here is indebted to Bergson's definition 
of the simultaneity of memory and perception in his 
discussion of the phenomenon of deja vu: "I hold that the 
formation of memory is never posterior to the formation of 
perception; it is contemporaneous with it. Step by step, as 
perception is created, the memory of it is projected beside 
it, as the shadow falls beside the body" (157-58) .
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ordinary consciousness. In "Burnt Norton," we are told that
Time past and time future 
Allow but a little consciousness.
To be conscious is not to be in time.
We only achieve true consciousness in rare moments when
time feels suspended and reality seems a fullness of being
gathered within a moment of eternity. Inexpressible, except
through metaphor, and unlocalizable like Bradley's
"immediate experience,1 it comes as
the unattended 
Moment, the moment in and out of time.
The distraction fit, lost in a shaft of sunlight,
The wild thyme unseen, or the winter lightning 
Or the waterfall, or music heard so deeply 
That it is not heard at all, but you are the music 
While the music lasts.
This "presence of consciousness" lives as music lives;
somatic and interior, it passes away and dissolves into
"waste sad time/Stretching before and after," leaving
behind the feeling that just for a moment we returned, as
in the deja vu, to a place of origin, "the first world" of
the rose-garden:
I can only say, there we have been: but I cannot say 
where
And I cannot say, how long, for that is to place it in 
time.
Because these experiences, like the mystic's, come 
with the force of the inarticulate and can only be 
expressed through the indirection and displacement of the 
figurative, the form of the Four Quartets, paralleling
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memory's constant return to and figuration of the past into 
the present, brings these experiences within the 
circumference of poetry's reach by the process of 
repetition and transfiguration of images, words, rhythms, 
and styles. Hugh Kenner first stated that the last three 
quartets "exfoliate" from the transcendent "moment in the 
rose-garden" of "Burnt Norton," many of their images and 
figures a compression and repetition of those from the 
opening quartet (Invisible 296), yet each quartet also 
spirals out from other personal experiences with the 
timeless, their figures also drawn into the concentric 
patterning of the poetry.
This "motif technique," according to James Olney, 
evokes and yet transforms the past as each motif acquires 
new and richer significances with its introduction and 
reintroduction into new contexts offered by the overall 
pattern, which like that of music, embodies both the 
circular return and integration of memory and the linear 
movement of the present's progress into the future.
There are many pasts, however, which are repeated.
Most immediately, the poems repeat their own pasts, if 
again we think of them as existing in the time of their 
reading; earlier passages are quoted, integrated, and 
thereby transformed into larger patterns of meaning.
Lyndall Gordon has compared this pattern of repetition to
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the essays of Emerson "where each sentence is self- 
contained but repeats, in different terms, the same idea" 
and Whitman's use of the sermon's tactic where each "unit, 
whether homely or poetic, is designed to awaken the 
audience on different levels, to the same revelation" (96- 
97). Therefore, the repetition and interplay of beginnings 
and ends: the opening line of "East Coker"--"In my 
beginning is my end"--is quoted in reversal at the 
quartet's closing, "In my end is my beginning," and again 
picked up and modified in "Dry Salvages":
When time stops and time is never ending;
And the ground swell, that was from the beginning
and finally completed in the last section of "Little 
Gidding" with the lines
What we call the beginning is often the end
And to make an end is to make a beginning.
Framing the poet's imaginative progress from East 
Coker to the America of his childhood memories of St.
Louis, the Mississippi and Cape Ann and back to the present 
moment in the church at Little Gidding, each repetition 
complicates the poet's own repetition of his "beginnings" 
and "ends," by expanding the poet's experience into a 
larger circumference of beginnings and endings, which 
includes the pasts of others before him. Thus his journey 
repeats his ancestor Andrew Elyot's voyage to America and 
by implication, the Puritan journey away from history into
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the experiment of modernity, parallelling the poet's own 
search for origin.
The rupture in time at the open field in East Coker 
offers the melancholic vision of sixteenth-century 
Breughel-like peasants at dance. The rhythms of their 
circling and leaping, of their "Feet rising and falling" 
over the dirt which covers those gone before them now 
"nourishing the corn," keep the time of cyclical death and 
rebirth, of "Dung and death." The fall into the darkness 
of death is repeated in the third section's fall into the 
darkness of history of the contemporary "eminent," whether 
"industrial lords and petty contractors," or "generous 
patrons of art, the statesmen and the rulers." And at the 
end of the guartet, before the poet's journey to America, 
we will find that the pattern of the life fulfilled in the 
poetry repeats the patterns of other lives, of "dead and 
living":
. . . Not the intense moment 
Isolated, with no before and after,
But a lifetime burning in every moment
And not the lifetime of one man only
But of old stones that cannot be deciphered.
And in "Dry Salvages," the poet will "repeat"
. . . I have said before
That the past experience revived in the meaning 
Is not the experience of one life only 
But of many generations.
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There is yet one more life, one more past repeated and 
transformed in the poem, that of the reader.
Unlike The Waste Land, in which the "discourse of
(Quotation " foregrounds the "written-ness," the scripted
word, encouraging spatial metaphors (such as the montage or
the cubist work), words in the Four Quartets announce
themselves as voiced, as sounds falling through a
surrounding silence into the echo chamber of the reader's
consciousness, seeking the engagement of memory:
Footfalls echo in the memory 
Down the passage which we did not take 
Towards the door we never opened 
Into the rose-garden. My words echo 
Thus, in your mind.
Before we get to the last sentence, we are in the position
of an audience, invisible and disinterested, reading of
another "we," of the poet and someone else, and of their
remembrance figured as the movement of footfalls down a
passage, but the last sentence's startling address to us
localizes our consciousness within the poem so that the
sounds of the footfalls echoing become also the sound of
Eliot's words moving through our memory, the figurative
"passage" of memory becoming the literal "passage" of the
text which passes into the interior corridors of our memory
(a word-play similar to "Gerontion"'s punning with textual
and cranial "passages").
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The identification of words as sounds made living 
significations by the memory does more here, of course, 
than merely reveal the crucial dependence, as defined by 
Gilson, of poetry and music on memory and time. The poet's 
words, echoing in our minds, engage our own act of memory 
so that we join the "footfalls" of the poet's imaginative 
retrospection of the rose garden. Unlike the Stetson 
passage of The Waste Land, where the reader's presence is 
discovered, condemned and banished by the force of 
exclamation, here the reader is gently invited in, made 
part of the journey of the poem. From this point on, we 
follow the directions of the poet's voice, bringing to 
those figures of consciousness our own, becoming part of 
the process of expansion from the private experience to 
representative experience. Thus, the studied, ahistorical 
abstractness of much of the poems' figures--the rose, the 
garden, children laughing in the leaves, the waterfall, 
dust, sunlight and lightning, movement and stillness--and 
the related submersion of the specific personal sources of 
many of these figures are meant to evoke a universal 
experience. James Olney states that in the poet's 
disappearance into "patterns of universalized experience," 
in the disappearance of the "personal and historic Eliot," 
the "I" and the "we" are transformed into "not the historic 
and typical but the representative and symbolic" (305).
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The Impulse behind this transformation of the private 
into the universal, or to go back to the "Note on War 
Poetry,"
the abstract conception 
Of private experience at its greatest intensity 
Becoming universal, which we call 'poetry',
is part of the attempt to create what I earlier called "a
life above a life," a wholeness completed through a moving
pattern whose details are formed by the repetition of
history in consciousness. And in this "life," which is the
"poetry" of the Four Quartets, war functions in two ways.
First, war, as the general historical context of the poems,
in its immediate danger impels the poem's search for a
transcendent pattern, serving as a menacing counterpoint to
the poem's ascending rhythms. Second, as in the "Note on
War Poetry" in which the war is "enveloped and scattered"
by the form of the symbolic, the historical reality of war
is transfigured into a trope for the poet's own war with
language and tradition to create the perfection of the
symbol which will draw into and around itself, like the
"still point," the past and future. This figural merging of
war and literary construction, however, as in Gerontion and
The Waste Land, exposes the ultimate failure of poetry to
transcend history, but in The Four Quartets, the failure is
revealed as one without which poetry could not exist
because its form is always in some sense a hybrid of that
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which is dying and empty and that which is present and 
living, just as music's "victorious ability to affirm the 
being that it creates is inseparable from its essential 
resignation to its own demise" (Gilson 146).
The theme of return and repetition in the Four 
Quartets, or to use Olney's phrase, of "recall and 
recapitulation," extends to Eliot's own body of work 
(another of the repeated pasts of the poems), and in "East 
Coker" and "Little Gidding," the figuration of war occurs 
in passages that recall and respond to passages in 
“Gerontion" and in The Waste Land, where we have already 
traced the merging of historical and formal violence. But 
before we extend the Four Quartets' "quotations" into other 
poems, we must first look at how the second and fifth 
sections of "East Coker” return to and transform the 
corresponding sections of “Burnt Norton."
Close studies by many readers have demonstrated how 
the quartets' five-part structures thematically and 
formally parallel each other. For example, the second 
sections of "Burnt Norton" and "East Coker" both open in a 
lyrical style which then dissipates into a more discursive, 
"philosophic" style, and the fifth sections of each poem 
deal with the issue of language, but another parallel 
exists. The lyrics of the second sections both involve the 
enclosure of violence and war by the aesthetic, and the
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figures of war in "East Coker"'s second and fifth sections 
repeat, complicate, and finally critique this enclosure of 
historical violence.
The opening of the second section of "Burnt Norton," a
lyric in the symbolist style that even echoes Mallarme,3
celebrates the reconcilement of opposites through the
ascending pattern of correspondences figured in the rhythms
of a music and dance of being:
Garlic and sapphires in the mud 
Clot the bedded axle-tree.
The trilling wire in the blood 
Sings below inveterate scars 
And reconciles forgotten wars.
The dance along the artery 
The circulation of the lymph 
Are figured in the drift of stars 
Ascend to summer in the tree 
We move above the moving tree 
In light upon the figured leaf 
And hear upon the sodden floor 
Below, the boarhound and the boar 
Pursue their pattern as before 
But reconciled among the stars.
History's "inveterate scars," its "forgotten wars," its
predators and victims pursuing the endless cycle of
aggression and death, which fashions history's narrative,
are absorbed into a pattern of ascending correspondences
spiralling from the ground of the inorganic through the
vitality of the animate and finally to the heavens, where
3 See Mallarme's "M'introduire dans ton histoire, " where
occurs the line "Tonnerre et rubis aux moyeux," and see "Le
tombeau de Charles Baudelaire,1 where the image of "boue et
rubis" occurs (174).
152
the eternal forms of the constellations figure and 
reconcile the mortal configurations below into one eternal, 
unmoving pattern.
Five years later, in a time of war, the poet returns
in "East Coker"' s second section, the most melancholic
section of the guartets, to repeat and to critigue the
lyrical enclosure and transcendence of war, a lyricism that
in the context of war must seem a dangerous naivete. Like
the "Burnt Norton" passage, the "East Coker" lyric
continues in the symbolist style to express the mirroring
of the heavenly in the earthly, mortal patterns reflecting
the immortal. Mallarme's line "Tonnerre et rubis aux
moyeux" now gives Eliot the “Thunder" which "Simulates
triumphal cars," cars alluding to the last line of
Mallarme's "M'introduire dans ton histoire": "Du seul
vesperal de mes chars." Seasonal chaos replaces the
languid summer of the moving leaf figured in the light;
movements of frustrated ascent, the falling movements of
"writhing" and "tumbling down" contrast with the
oscillating harmony of descent and ascent along the "summer
in the tree," the axle-tree:
What is the late November doing 
With the disturbance of the spring 
And creatures of the summer heat,
And snowdrops writhing under feet 
And hollyhocks that aim too high 
Red into grey and tumble down 
Late roses filled with early snow?
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Climatic disturbances mirror astrological wars, where stars
no longer drifting, no longer reconciling "forgotten wars"
by their constellated patterns, whirl in their own
hostilities, the Sun and the Moon going down just as the
hollyhocks below "tumble down":
Thunder rolled by the rolling stars 
Simulates triumphal cars 
Deployed in constellated wars 
Scorpion fights against the Sun 
Until the Sun and Moon go down.
The boarhound's chase of the boar becomes in heaven
a hunt through Eliot's pun on the Leonids, meteor showers,
which like comets, in their rarity portend historical
calamity:
Comets weep and Leonids fly 
Hunt the heavens and the plains 
Whirled in a vortex that shall bring 
The world to that destructive fire 
Which burns before the ice-cap reigns.
The lyric's whirling vortex of apocalypse and its
extravagant diction return us both to the thematic vortex
of "fractured atoms" and to the voluptuary rhetoric of
"Gerontion." Although the "East Coker" lyric reverses the
theme of the "Burnt Morton" lyric by contrasting cosmic war
with universal reconciliation, it nevertheless repeats the
distancing and refining effects of the formal enclosure of
the violent--effects that are abruptly suspended by the
intrusion of the poet's censoring comments, which, in their
154
dry, colloquial tone and discursive style expose the
artificiality and irrelevancy of the lyric:
That was a way of putting it--not very satisfactory:
A periphrastic study in a worn-out poetical fashion.
The censure here involves, however, more than the
abandonment of the outmoded symbolist style in favor of a
more contemporary one. The issue concerns the lyric's
failure to figure "it"--the war. The lyric's periphrasis,
its attempt to circumlocute and thus to displace the
reality of war into the aesthetic, is rejected,
Leaving one still with the intolerable wrestle 
With words and meanings.
The figuration of war returns to its point of origin, the
poet' s own war with language to represent and thus to bring
an intelligibility to the historical situation at hand.
The ensuing lines then orchestrate an intricate pattern of
ambiguous reference that brings together poetry, history,
and war:
The poetry does not matter, 
it was not (to start again) what one had expected
The "It" here can refer to its immediate antecedent, “the
poetry, “ and thus, can indicate both the poet's despondent
recognition of the irrelevancy of his medium in the larger
movements of history and, more immediately, his abandonment
of the lyric mode as a viable vehicle for his meaning. He
will "start again" in another discourse. The "It,"
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however, can also refer to what the poetry was trying to 
communicate in the first place, to the "it" of "That was a 
way of putting it"--to the war figured in the opening 
lyric- To "start again," to attempt again to represent the 
war as history's "horrific capability," is to backtrack 
over the rhetorical euphony of Eliot's lyric and, in turn, 
because of the lyric's echoing of the grandiloquence of 
Gerontion's words, to return to the themes of "Gerontion," 
except now, because "the poetry does not matter," 
"Gerontion"'s deploring of history's betrayal returns 
divested of its rhetorical theatrics:
What was to be the value of the long looked forward to. 
Long hoped for calm, the autumnal serenity 
And the wisdom of age? Had they deceived us 
Or deceived themselves, the quiet-voiced elders. 
Bequeathing us merely a receipt for deceit?
The serenity only a deliberate hebetude.
The wisdom only the knowledge of dead secrets 
Useless in the darkness into which they peered 
Or from which they turned their eyes.
Gerontion's hebetude, his blindness, and his deceits as
figures for the consciousness of Europe confused by the
shock of the First World War return again in a new context
of another world war, one which again has revealed the
discrepancy between expectations of historical and moral
progress and "what the treacherous years were all the while
making for." Because poetry is also a historical
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"receipt," in the sense of a recipe or formula4, it 
participates in and is engendered by all the "recipes for 
deceit," the formulas of the historian, the politician, the 
artist, of all the "quiet-voiced elders" of literary 
history, as Eliot's own "periphrastic" formula deceives in 
its figuration of the violence of war into its eloquent 
textures.
But Eliot here returns to a former poetry, in a way to
a former version of his poetic self, returns not just, as
he feared time and again to iTohn Hayward during the
drafting of the poems,5 to repeat himself but rather to
integrate and to transfigure "Gerontion"'s old fear of
history's betrayal and its resultant suspicion of the
historically sedimented nature of language into a present
awareness of the necessary provisionality and distortion of
all constructs:
The knowledge imposes a pattern, and falsifies. 
For the pattern is new in every moment 
And every moment is a new and shocking 
Valuation of all we have been.
Nevertheless, in the face of the incomprehensibility of a
history whose rationale repeatedly defeats our willed forms
4 Answering John Hayward's puzzlement over the word's 
meaning, Eliot explained that he meant "Receipt, I mean of 
course in the sense of recipe or formula" (qtd. in Gardner 
101) .
5 See selections from the Eliot-Hayward correspondence 
in Gardner 23-25.
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and comprehension, we are left, not in Dante's "middle 
way," but "all the way, in a dark wood."
The immediate concern with imposing an aesthetic form 
upon the "situation" of war, with which the section opens, 
by the end of the section has been integrated into a larger 
problem of the belatedness of language, which by its 
nature, must always lag behind the flux of experience 
because of our dependence on memory, which must always, as 
we have seen, be transforming and yet transformed by the 
unexpected. The only answer becomes "the wisdom of 
humility"--the knowledge that every construct, every 
"recall and recapitulation," every poem enacts its own 
mortality, the inevitability of becoming "worn-out." And 
this humility must be "endless," for there is no end to the 
process of return and recovery, even in the face of the 
inevitability of failure and mortality when, as the section 
ends.
The houses are all gone under the sea 
The dancers are all gone under the hill.
In the fifth section of "East Coker," the poet 
retrieves the violent imagery of the fifth section of 
"Burnt Norton," in which the struggle of words to contain 
both the "beginning and the end," the wholeness of the 
unbounded still center, is figured in a violence which
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assaults the word:
Words strain 
Crack and sometimes break, under the burden,
Under the tension, slip, slide, perish,
Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place, 
Will not stay still.
This violence within the word, in the fifth section of
“East Coker" becomes a war between the word and the
inarticulate, between the staticizing form of language and
the experiential, which in its flux is "new in every
moment." The menace and enchantment of the "middle way" of
history's "grimpen" of the second section becomes the
private "middle way" of the middle-aged Eliot, who now
figures his own poetic career as a war with language, a war
itself framed by two wars:
So here X am, in the middle way, having had twenty years--
Twenty years largely wasted, the years of l'entre deux
guerres —
Trying to learn to use words, and every attempt
Is a wholly a new start, and a different kind of failure
Because one has only learnt to get the better of words
For the thing one no longer has to say, or the way in which
One is no longer disposed to say it. And so each venture
Is a new beginning, a raid on the inarticulate
With shabby equipment always deteriorating
In the general mess of imprecision of feeling,
Undisciplined squads of emotion.
Eliot's figuration of war into his private concerns, his 
use of war to ground and to figure lyrical anxieties here 
repeats the collapse of the second section's poetic 
enclosure of war into its point of origin, the poet's own 
war. The war collapses back onto the life, but just as in
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the second section, where the poet's "intolerable 
wrestling" to bring form to the war leads to a general 
network of correspondences between poetry, history, and 
war, the following lines, in their figuration of war, merge 
the poet's personal confrontation with the paradoxes of his 
modernity with the war's succession of military victory and 
loss manifested in the push and pull of territorial 
borders, expanding the life of the poet into a greater 
"life," in which we all participate--the final appeal 
transcending the aesthetic into the political immediacy of 
necessary and indifferent action:
And what there is to conquer 
By strength and submission, has already been discovered 
Once or twice, or several times, by men whom one cannot 
hope
To emulate--but there is no competition--
There is only the fight to recover what has been lost
And found and lost again: and now, under conditions
That seem unpropitious. But perhaps neither gain nor loss.
For us, there is only the trying. The rest is not our
business.
The second section of "Little Gidding" returns to the 
theme of the violence of writing, but now war is no longer 
figured and absorbed into the poet's private war with 
language and mortality; the metaphoric impetus recedes into 
a metonymic contiguity of the situation of war and the 
necessary violence and mortality of all writing. The 
nightly bombing of London, the eerie stillness of the 
devastation revealed at daylight, and Eliot's experiences
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as an air raid warden and a fire-watcher find themselves in
the opening lyric, which unlike the first two lyrics we
have looked at, carry a precision of observation:
Ash on an old man's sleeve,
is all the ash the burnt roses leave.
Dust in the air suspended
Marks the place where the story ended.
Dust inbreathed was a house--
The wall, the wainscot and the mouse.
The death of hope and despair.
This is the death of air.
There are flood and drouth 
Over the eyes and in the mouth 
Dead water and dead sand 
Contending for the upper hand.
The parched eviscerate soil 
Gapes at the vanity of toil.
Laughs without mirth.
This is the death of earth.
Explosions falling through the sky literally meant a "death 
of air,1 and the dust, ash, and smoke often lay in thick 
folds in the air for hours after a night of bombing so that 
an old man's sleeve, especially that of a fire-warden 
standing in observation on a roof-top, would have been 
covered with ash. Dust would have been all that was left of 
a house or building, and where the ground was "parched" and 
"eviscerate," as cables and broken sewer pipes would have 
been exposed in the broken street, water flooding the 
streets, buckets of sand and water gathered to put out the 
smoldering fires--"the death of water and fire."
Lyndall Gordon has remarked that "the feat of Eliot's 
greatest poetry was to convert urban reality into
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nightmare, hallucination, vision," and just as the First
World War offered Eliot the trope of a city of the living
dead, as well as the image of tradition as a rubble, the
Second World War bombing of London offers a landscape
"already ready-made for vision" (130). The vision of this
section--the encounter with the "compound ghost" and the
related convergence of Dante's inferno with the streets of
London--consciously recalls the Stetson passage of The
Waste Land, in which the city achieved a spectral
transparency between past and present allowing for the
violent encounter between the poet and the mute Stetson,
who, as we have seen, is a metonym of war. But, unlike the
Stetson passage, where war is buried in the figure of the
silent Stetson and is used to figure the formal violence of
the "discourse of quotation," in the "Little Gidding"
passage, war is the locus and catalyst for the encounter
between the "dead master" and the living poet:
in the uncertain hour before the morning 
Near the ending of interminable night 
At the recurrent end of the unending 
After the dark dove with the flickering tongue 
Had passed below the horizon of his homing 
While the dead leaves still rattled on like tin 
Over the asphalt where no other sound was 
Between three districts whence the smoke arose 
I met one walking, loitering and hurried.
The "intersection of time" occurs when "two worlds become
much like each other,1 when, in an inversion of Dante's
journey, the dead ascend to our world, like Hamlet's ghost,
during the intersection time between night and morning, in 
the coming approach of dawn when the light and the time are 
uncertain. It comes as the "ending of interminable night/
At the recurrent end of the unending"--lines which again 
respond to the literal experience of the aftermath of an 
air-raid, when one is uncertain that the raid is over, and 
the end of the raid is only an "end of the unending," 
because the bombing will again begin with the next night 
and the next night, all dawns and all mornings only 
interim, uncertain periods in "one interminable night," 
which is the war. The bomber's descent as the descent of a 
dark dove, its fiery discharge a "flickering tongue," 
inverts the traditional symbol of the descent of the white 
Pentecostal dove which baptizes with tongues of flame, 
delivering in its inspiration the mastery of language; the 
"flickering tongue" of the bomber, however, as a descent of 
an infernal pentecost, disfigures the landscape, allowing 
for a figuration in which the dead and the living are given 
a momentary grace of communication. The literal 
disfigurement of the city itself figures a narrative of 
death, opening a space for the poet's own meditation on his 
relation to past tradition.
Instead of The Waste Land's flowing crowd of souls 
that moves over London Bridge, their march punctuated by 
their sighs and the sounds of bells, the city here is
empty, silent except for the "metal leaves" of shrapnel 
rattling over the asphalt. The poet's encounter with the 
"down-turned face" of the ghost (recalling the down-turned 
faces of The Waste Land's commuters), his "pointed scrutiny 
with which we challenge/The first met stranger in the 
waning dusk" marks his persona (in contrast to that of 
commuter of the Stetson passage) as a sentinel on patrol, 
his duty to challenge and identify anyone who should not be 
on the street before the all-clear siren. Upon meeting, 
ghost and sentinel will tread "the pavement in a dead 
patrol" like the military comrades of the Stetson passage. 
And as in the Stetson passage, where the "X" and the 
"you's" initiate complex referential patterns, drawing, in 
their ambiguity, a series of doubles, of brothers-in-arms, 
murderers and co-conspirators, readers and writers, linking 
various pasts through the doubling of texts, the doubling 
of the ghost, who is defined as "compound," as well as of 
the poet who will "assume a double part," is prepared for 
by a yoking of opposites. As just noted, the "interminable 
night” is "ending," the "unending" is a "recurrent end."
The ghost moves slowly and quickly, "walking, loitering and 
hurried," the present participles matched with a past 
participle; the poet's "sudden look" reveals someone whom 
he has known, yet forgotten, yet "half-recalled,1 an
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understandable series o£ opposites since the "dead master" 
is "both one and many.1
He is a "familiar compound ghost," who is both 
intimate and unidentifiable. A representative figure for 
all the past influences on Eliot--Yeats, Joyce, Mallarme, 
Shelley, Swift, Dante are the ones most mentioned by 
readers--he, as Kenner has it, "embodies also the 
simultaneity of the literary past" (Invisible 321) . In the 
Stetson passage, Eliot embodied such a simultaneity through 
the juxtaposition of indirect and direct quotations of 
"ruined" texts, tracing patterns of mortality both cultural 
and personal. Here, there are no fragments from the texts 
of "dead masters," but only a vague allusiveness making up 
the "compound ghost" who is not constructed through the 
interpenetration of literary sources but through the 
integration of the poet's creative consciousness of those 
sources, an integration, in a sense, of what Olney calls 
all the "past Eliots" (303).
Like the hooded Christ on the road to Emaeus, like the 
disguised Odysseus, or like Dante's encounter with Brunetto 
Latini (the original source of this passage), like all 
recognition scenes, this scene begins with the uncertainty 
before recognition, an uncertainty that arises out of the 
co-existence of familiarity and strangeness that is part of 
any encounter between self and other. The other's visage
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is familiar, intimate because as human if mirrors and
confirms our own, yet it is strange, unidentifiable,
impenetrable because it is yet not our own. For the
encounter to be fully realized into the communion of self
and other, or more specifically here, of past and present,
of the living and dead, of spiritual and material,
annunciations and identifications are required. The poet's
cry to Stetson, its merging of the forces of recognition
and accusation in its "you," received no response, the
silent Stetson, as Donoghue stated, merely operating as an
absent center for a series of violent interrogations. In
the "Little Gidding" passage, annunciation and recognition
occur through a doubling of the poet into the dead master
who becomes both questioner and respondent:
So I assumed a double part, and cried
And heard another's voice cry: 'What are you here?'
Although we were not. I was still the same,
Knowing myself yet being someone other--
And he a face still forming; yet the words sufficed
To compel the recognition they preceded.
With the assumption of a "double part," reminiscent of
Gerontion's doubling into spectator and actor and of the
poet's doubling and re-doubling of voices in The Waste
Land, the "I" of the poet becomes as provisional, as
compound, as familiar and strange, as intimate and
impenetrable as the ghostly visage before him, and thus as
representative as the self whose consciousness the poems
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are metaphors for. As the ghost is made up of a 
"repetition" of former selves, of former influences and 
masters, his visage cannot be deciphered or animated, 
except through its repetition and reanimation by the 
beholder's self-dramatization, the poet's granting the mask 
of his own presentness to the past, so that it may speak, 
its repetitions no longer spelling the exhaustion and 
emptiness of the textual repetition of The Waste Land but 
indicating the fulfillment of the past in the present.
Two contrasting themes run through the ghost's 
soliloquy. First, walking through a scene of violent 
destruction, the "dead master" reveals the mortality of all 
writing, that every word, every poem, inevitably falls into 
the obsolescence or the oblivion of the past:
Last season's fruit is eaten 
And the fullfed beast shall kick the empty pail.
For last year's words await another voice.
And next year's words await another voice.
So, in this passage, in a quartet which will ultimately
reveal the use of memory as the liberation from history and
death, the threat of amnesia haunts the passage as a
counterpoint of death. The poet, urging the ghost to
speak, admits that he "may not comprehend, may not
remember." And, as the ghost is "not eager to rehearse/My
thought and theory which you have forgotten," so will
Eliot's be forgotten after having "served their purpose:
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let them be." This reminder of the mortality, however, is 
meliorated by the actuality that the past can speak in the 
present in ways unforeseen by the past, that, as John 
Riquelme states, "the fate of writing and of the past in 
general is always to be understood in ways that could not 
be anticipated" (64) . Thus the voice from the past finds 
"words 1 never thought to speak/In streets X never thought 
to revisit." And thus, in the first section of "Little 
Gidding," we are told.
And what the dead had no speech for, when living,
They can tell you, being dead: the communication
Of the dead is tongued with fire beyond the language of the
living.
Through the appropriation and transfiguration of the
past by the present text, the words of the dead transcend
their creators' lives, achieving new meanings and new
significances through which the present can see its own
face; in the same way the present text, in its repetition
and transfiguration of the past, "speaks itself free"
through its formal confounding of temporality, just as in
the "life," memory appropriates and redeems the deadness of
the past into the moment of present consciousness. When the
ghost refers to "the passage,"
which now presents no hindrance
To the spirit unappeased and peregrine
Between two worlds become much like each other,
a passage opened by the violent rupture of war, we might 
first think of metaphorical passages--the passage between 
the underworld and the "middle world, 1 the passage to the 
"rose-garden," Alice's rabbit's passage, the passages of 
war or the passages of history down which blind men 
stumble--but familiar with Eliot's punning on the word 
passage, we know that this passage which allows the past 
poets and past selves to speak through the ventriloquist 
self also denotes the passage of the text before us, where 
indeed Dante, or Shelley, or Yeats, or Joyce, or Eliot's 
words make palpable, in their passing, through their willed 
and sometimes violent meeting with the "logic of death,” 
(for which, as Riquelme states, "the living have no 
adequate language" (65)), not only the mortal root of all 
writing but also a metaphor for resurrection.
EPILOGUE
Apropos of Eliot's play on ends and beginnings, this 
study began with the lining up of charges, both direct and 
implied, against the poet of the Four Quartets, charges 
emanating from a complex web of assumptions concerning 
normative relations of poetry to the barbarism of modern 
war, to modernity and authenticity, and to political and 
moral relevance. To investigate the implications of 
Eliot's figuration of war, we began with the first "post­
war" poem, “Gerontion," written after the first of the deux 
guerres that framed Eliot's poetic career, continued with 
the second "post-war" poem. The Waste Land, and finally 
ended where we began, with Eliot's poetry of the Second 
world War, the Four Quartets. This apparently 
chronological movement was not meant to begin at the 
beginning, to seek some genetic development of Eliot's 
thoughts on the relation of war to poetry as expressed in 
the poems, as if to trace the unified development of an 
"idea in progress" from 1919 to 1942. Rather, because 
Eliot's figuration of war in the Four Quartets occurs in 
passages that "repeat" "Gerontion" and The Waste Land, and,
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in turn, because these passages are part of a larger whole 
of the "recall and recapitulation" of a "poetic life, 1 it 
was more appropriate to follow Eliot's own direction: to 
"start again," to return to the beginning, to seek out the 
individual pasts of the "life," to establish their nature, 
and then to return to the point from which we began, the 
Four Quartets, not so much to put forward a defense, an 
apologia, as to demonstrate how the poetry itself, both in 
its beginnings and its ends, anticipated and grappled with 
the charges made long after its publication.
The figuration of war, significantly more apparent in 
the Four Quartets than in the earlier poems, stands as a 
trope, however unstable, for the problematic correlation of 
the poetic and the historical in a time of total war when 
all cultural forms seemed suddenly deprived of their 
innocence. To write poetry in a time of war, for T. S. 
Eliot, was to confront the accusations of history's 
"horrific capability," accusations of poetry's complicity, 
of its irrelevance, of its inadequacy. To figure such a 
threat into the poetry meant not to cancel or to evade 
history's accusatory colloquy but, by giving it form, to 
articulate the necessary implication of all writing in the 
conditions of history. It is, however, this very freedom 
of willed form and the subsequent opportunity for the 
encounters and valedictions of past and present, the
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precarious encounter of reader and writer, repeated and 
transformed by each generation--like that of Eliot's 
compound-ghost--which give, to use George Steiner's phrase, 
the "edge of conjecture" to the transcendence of mortality.
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